Trade Unions of the World

8th edition

Edited by:
Daniel Blackburn

With the research assistance of:
Ciaran Cross

International Centre for Trade Union Rights (‘ICTUR’)

With our thanks also to the great many researchers, trade unionists, academics and lawyers who have assisted with our queries in the preparation of this updated and revised edition, and to the numerous others who contributed to previous editions of this book over the years, in particular the team responsible for the extensively revised 7th edition.
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Belgium

Political and Economic Background

Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were collectively known as the Low Countries and are now often referred to as the Benelux states due to their shared heritage and close economic and cultural ties. From the 16th Century until the Belgian Revolution in 1830, when Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, the area of Belgium was the venue for conflict between European powers. Belgium grew in wealth and power following independence as a result of industrialisation in the 19th century and its colonisation of African countries: millions of Congolese were killed or worked to death during King Leopold’s brutal rule over the Belgian colony of the Congo (see entry for Democratic Republic of Congo). With decolonisation Belgium’s power waned, though it found a new international identity as home to the European Union, and to the numerous international organisations, businesses, and lobby groups that have located to Brussels to engage with Europe’s key political institutions. In 2020, during the ‘Black Lives Matter’ protests (which have led to renewed global scrutiny of the legacy of colonialism and slavery), King Philippe of Belgium wrote to President Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo to express ‘regret’ at the colonial era, stating that: ‘during the time of the Congo Free State (1885-1908) acts of violence and brutality were committed, which weigh still on our collective memory. The colonial period that followed also caused suffering and humiliations. I would like to express my deepest regrets for the wounds of the past, the pain of today, which is rekindled by the discriminations all too present in our society’.

Belgium’s political culture has experienced increased tensions between the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking citizens. The tensions were caused by language differences and the economic disparities between Wallonia and Flanders, which has led to constitutional reforms in the period from 1970 to 1993 when Belgium changed from a unitary to a federal government. Under this process Belgium became a federation of three regions, Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, each with its own government and legislature, and three communities (Flemish, French and German) for educational and cultural purposes. The regions have considerable powers in the social and economic fields. At federal level the national divisions are reflected in the composition of the legislature with the Flemish and Wallonia communities having their separate parties for each ideological stream. The Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CDV, English: Christian Democrat and Flemish), formerly the Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP, English: Christian People’s Party), has normally been the strongest single party in recent decades, providing the Prime Minister in coalition governments which have included coalitions with the Liberals in 1981–88, the Parti Socialiste (PS, English: Socialist Party) and the Volksunie (VU, English: People’s Union) in 1988–91 and the Socialists in 1992–99. Polling, however, has usually been divided with ten or more parties each taking between 5-10% of the vote, resulting in coalition governments. The 1999-2007 Verhofstadt government achieved a balanced budget, some tax and labour-market reform and was the last administration to provide Belgium with stable government for a lengthy period. However, Verhofstadt’s coalition performed poorly in the June 2007 elections and the country experienced a political crisis for over a year, which even led to speculation that Belgium may be partitioned.

Indeed, political instability was not resolved by the interim Verhofstadt Government, which was in office from 21 Dec. 2007 until 20 March 2008. It consisted of a coalition of the Flemish and Francophone Christian Democrats, the Flemish and Francophone Liberals, together with the Francophone Social Democrats. The Flemish Christian Democrat Yves Leterme was the winner of the federal elections of June 2007 and was temporarily leader between March and Dec. 2008 when he resigned because of the lack of progress in constitutional reforms and a scandal involving the sale of Fortis to BNP Paribas. However, his Flemish Christian Democratic colleague, Herman Van Rompuy, became Prime Minister on 30 Dec. 2008 until he left office to become the President of the European Council on 19 Nov. 2009. A new government was then formed under Prime Minister Yves Leterme, but his administration only lasted until 26 April 2010. Belgium was governed by Leterme’s caretaker government awaiting the end of the deadlocked negotiations for formation of a new government until Dec. 2011 when the Walloon socialist Elio Di Rupo became Prime Minister. On 22 July 2014, Charles Michel of the Mouvement Réformateur (MR, English: Reformist Movement) and Kris Peeters of the Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V, English: Christian Democratic and Flemish) formed a new federal cabinet composed of the Flemish parties Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA, English: New Flemish Alliance) CD&V, Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD, English: Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats), and the French-speaking MR. This grouping is right-wing, christian democrat and liberal in composition, with the PS socialists out of government for the first time in 25 years. In late 2018 the right-wing N-VA resigned from the government over their coalition partners’ support for the Global Compact for Migration, but the other parties continued to administer a caretaker government until the 2019 elections. Again voting was heavily polarised between the regions. The highest polling parties were the right-wing Flemish parties N-VA (on 16%) and more controversial right-wing nationalist Vlaams Belang (VB, English: Flemish Interest) (on 11%), followed by the socialists PS on 9%. During the political deadlock over the formation of a coalition government a caretaker cabinet was in place under Sophia Wilmes of the French-speaking, liberal VR party. As the Covid-19 global health crisis hit in early 2020 there was still no agreement on a coalition, but the rival groups stepped back and the minority government was sworn-in to deal with the crisis. Belgium is one of the worst affected countries with one of the world’s highest number of deaths relative to population size.

Despite the political instability, cultural tensions and economic uncertainties of the last decade, Belgium remains a generally prosperous economy based on services and a wide range of industries, and Brussels is the leading administrative centre for the institutions of the European Union. However, linguistic division is exacerbated by the fact that the north in general is more prosperous and has a more modern entrepreneurial and technology-based economy. During the 1980s, the old industrial sectors such as coal mining and iron and steel, which were heavily concentrated in Wallonia, suffered a severe decline and this contributed to the atmosphere of crisis that led to the constitutional re-basing of the country as a looser federation. Unemployment is a continuing problem and Belgium also has a significantly lower rate of participation in the work force than neighbours such as the Netherlands and Germany. Belgian GDP declined by -0.3% in 2012 because of the on-going impact of the global financial crisis, but during 2013 the economic situation in the euro zone improved and this stimulated Belgian exports, which are an important factor in the open Belgian economy. However, although the number of jobs in Belgian industry has been in decline over many years, the economic 

Western Europe
recession continues to have a negative impact. The share of the industrial sector in total employment has been less than 20% since 2009, whereas the number of jobs has been increasing in the services sector to approximately 80% of total Belgian employment. These economic conditions have had an impact on union membership and density, as in the past the industrial unions tended to have more members than those within the service sectors.

GDP (current, US$) $529.6bn. (2019, World Bank)
GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) $54,545 (2019, World Bank)
HDI index: 0.919 (17th of 189 countries ranked, UNDP data, 2018)
GINI index: 27.4 (10th of 159 countries ranked, World Bank data, 2017)

Trade Unionism


Trade unions in Belgium have a long history, with origins in the guilds of craftsmen that survived through the industrial revolution and provided a basis for the development of nineteenth-century craft unionism. They have traditionally been divided on linguistic, political and religious grounds. The two principal centres (as they have been since the end of World War II) are the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC) / Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond (ACV, English: Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) and the (socialist) Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (FGTB) / Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond (ABVV, English: General Federation of Belgian Labour). Reflecting the balance of forces in political life, in Belgium it is the Christian rather than the socialist centre that has traditionally been the larger and the CSC/ACV, which has about 1.7 million members, was the WCL’s leading affiliate in western Europe. The FGTB/ABVV has a membership of something over 1.5 million. For many years these two trade union centres (accounting for about 90% of union members) kept apart, a habit reinforced by their political links (the CSC/ACV with the Christian Democrats, the FGTB with the Socialists) and poor personal relations between their leaders, but relations have improved since the late 1980s. The third significant centre is the Centrale Générale des Syndicats Libéraux de Belgique (CGSLB) / Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden (ACLV, English: General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium), which has 290,000 members.

The relative strength of the main centres has not greatly changed in recent times. Indeed, workplace democracy is strong within Belgium as social elections are organised every four years to establish the representativeness of the trade unions and the participation rate of workers in these elections is high. For example, the 2012 social elections had a participation rate of 71%, which was similar to the 2008 figures. ACV-CSC obtained 56.1% of the seats for the Works Council, followed by ABVV-FGTB with 34.3% and ACLVB-CGSLB with 7.9%. Figures for 2016 were similar. Although trade union membership is declining throughout Europe, in Belgium the trend is still positive and trade union density is approximately 50%, which has been quite stable in the last decade. The unions’ strength is reflected in their role in the process of ‘concertation’ or social and economic partnership, a partnership that in turn reinforces the position of the unions. The foundations of the state-backed system of social partnership were laid during reconstruction after World War II and despite periods of difficulty this has remained well entrenched. The social partners meet in the bilateral Conseil National du Travail (CNT) / Nationale Arbetsraad (NA, English: National Labour Council), established in 1952, which has been described by the government as a ‘social parliament’. The CNT provides advice and recommendations to the government and Parliament on social and employment-related issues. The CNT also provides the central representative organisations of employers and unions with a forum for negotiation of a two-yearly private sector framework bargaining agreement that provides the context for sectoral and plant-level negotiations. Likewise only unions affiliated to trade union centres represented on the CNT can participate in the public sector general bargaining committees.

The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has for many years criticised the preferential status the CNT gives those centres considered ‘most representative’ by the government, to the detriment of independent unions. The criteria used by the government are not formally defined but include representative status (numerical strength and nationwide organisation), organisational stability, and the ability to ensure respect for the agreements signed by members. The government also takes into account the fact that as the CNT works on the basis of unanimity it needs to be constructed on a basis that encourages consensus. It remains the case that only the Christian, socialist, and liberal trade union confederations are permitted to participate in the CNT. Representation is not strictly proportional to membership strength: there are 12 seats reserved on the CNT for the unions (the same number as for the employers’ organisations), with five representatives from the FGTB, five from the CSC, and two from the CGSLB. It cannot be doubted, however, that the present system in use in Belgium has proved satisfactory to the great majority of Belgian trade unions. The unions are generally resistant to concepts of ‘de-regulating’ Belgian society by reducing centralised bargaining and allowing more flexibility relating to specific circumstances.

Belgium is home to the trade union administered unemployment model known as the Ghent system, under which unions facilitate access to unemployment benefits, which are supported by government funds. It is not a requirement to be a union member to access basic unemployment funds, but unions provide a convenient and trusted portal, and they also assist their members in handling the bureaucracy of enrolment and claims. In common with other ‘Ghent’ system countries, Belgium enjoys a high level of trade union membership, and the role that unions play in relation to unemployment insurance has been important to establishing and maintaining that level of participation. The unions also participate in other state-sponsored institutions, including (at trade union centre level) the tripartite Conseil Central de l’Economie (CCE, English: Central Economic Council), set up in 1948, which has a consultative role on issues relating to the state of the economy as a whole, and the High Council on Preventive Measures and Protection at Work, which deals with health and safety. The unions carry out the role of paying unemployment benefits on behalf of the state. Belgium has a bi-annual collective bargaining round, during which lengthy negotiations between the social partners build-up to the declaration of a new national inter-sectoral agreement. The following year witnesses the negotiation of sectoral agreements, with company level agreements generally following in the second year, before the cycle begins again. The pay norm is a guide to subsequent sectoral and company level negotiations.

Strikes are permitted, including in essential services, other than in the case of seamen, the armed forces and magistrates. In 1993 the main centres united to call the first general strike for 58 years in opposition to a government austerity package. Although it did not prevent introduction of the measures, its impact was considerable - especially in Wallonia. The practice is not to prosecute strikers who fail to observe pre-strike procedures in collective bargaining agreements. Employers have sought to use the civil courts to obtain back-to-work orders but the legal position is ambiguous and courts
sometimes say that labour conflicts are not within their jurisdiction. In 2002 a so-called 'gentleman's agreement' reached under the aegis of the federal Ministry of Employment between the unions and employers organisations put an end to this practice, at least in theory. The social partners are, under the terms of the agreement, now resolved to find solutions to industrial disputes through social dialogue. The industrial sectors of the Belgian economy have tended to have the most strike days annually, but other sectors where strikes are common in Belgium include transport and health and social work. In 2011 and 2012 there were a dramatically increased number of days lost, especially as a result of the 30 Jan. 2012 national strike, which was organised in protest against the pension and saving measures of the government, and due to restructuring plans at large companies such as ArcelorMittal, Ford Genk and Caterpillar.

Trade Union Centres

1. Centrale Générale des Syndicats Libéraux de Belgique (CGSLB) / Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden (ACLVB) (General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium)
   
   **Address:** Boulevard Baudouin, 8 - 1000 Brussels
   **Phone:** +32 2 509 1600
   **E-Mail:** aclvb@aclvb.be, international@aclvb.be
   **Web:** www.aclvb.be / www.cgsdb.be
   **Membership:** 296,617 (ITUC, 2020)
   
   **History and character.** The CGSLB, the smallest of the three Belgian centres, traces its origins back to the nineteenth century and adopted its present name in 1939. Its structure has changed little since that time other than adapting to national decentralisation by creating regional organisations in 1989. It has links with the Belgian liberal parties although without political affiliation. The union describes its liberal vision in the following terms ‘everyone must have the opportunity to develop and thus improve his / her personal situation by making as many choices as possible’. In terms of its structure, it affiliates local and regional unions directly without an occupationally based union structure and thus it does not provide membership statistics for its affiliated regional union circles, as it is centrally organised and performs the collective bargaining for its various sectors. However, its public sector workers belong to the Freedom Syndicate for the Public Service (VSOA), which, while part of the same trade union family, is organised and administered separately, claiming to have approximately 70,000 of the CGSLB’s members.
   
   **Affiliation.** ITUC

   CGSLB’s largest national affiliate is:

   **Vrij Syndicaat voor het Openbaar Ambt (VSOA)**
   (Freedom Syndicate for the Public Service)
   
   **Address:** Lang Levenstraat 27-29, 1050 Brussel/Brussels
   **Phone:** +32 2 549 5200
   **E-Mail:** vsoa@vsoa.eu
   **Web:** www.vsoa.eu
   **Leadership.** François Fernandez-Corrales (chairman)
   **Membership.** 70,000 (est., TUW, 2020)
   
   **History and character.** VSOA-SLFP was formed in 1972 as the Free Trade Unions of the World, 2021

2. Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC) / Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond (ACV) (Confederation of Christian Trade Unions)
   
   **Address:** Chaussée de Haacht 579, 1031 Brussels
   **Phone:** 132 2 244 3520
   **E-Mail:** acv@acv-csc.be
   **Web:** www.acv-csc.be
   
   **Membership.** 1,581,550 (ITUC, 2020)
   **Leadership.** Marc Leemans (president)
   
   **History and character.** The CSC has a long history commencing in 1886 when the Christian Weavers of established the Ligue Antisocialiste des Ouvriers du Coton (English: Anti-Socialist League of Cotton Workers), the seed from which the CSC grew, in opposition to the first International developed from 1864 by Karl Marx. Thereafter, Christian trade unions grew in a somewhat haphazard way, often in connection with the development of cooperatives, mutual savings banks and workers’ improvement and self-help bodies. In Flanders, the model for Christian syndicalism was taken from the medieval craft guilds. By 1901 there were 62 Christian associations with 11,000 members.

   In 1904 the Secretariat Général des Unions Professionelles Chrétiens de Belgique (English: General Secretariat of Christian Trade Unions of Belgium) was formed, and between 1904 and 1908 professional federations, with nearly 40,000 members, were created covering a wide range of trades and industries. In 1909 the Confédération Nationale des Syndicats Chrétiens et Libres (English: National Confederation of Free and Christian Trade Unions) was formed, with separate organisations for Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia, as part of the Ligue Démocratique Beige (LDB, English: Democratic League of Belgium). In 1912 the organisations for Flanders and Wallonia were fused, and the confederation held its first convention autonomously from the LDB. In 1923 the present name was adopted. All normal trade union activity ended after the German occupation of Belgium in 1940, but the CSC office resumed its work on the day Brussels was liberated (4 Sept. 1944). During the 1970s a greater regional devolution of powers was carried out by the CSC, in parallel with the broader political process whereby increasing regional autonomy was granted to the three regions of Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. The CSC established regional executives in 1974 and, in 1978, special committees for the three regions were established at its national headquarters.

   The CSC/ACV is built on two pillars, the regional structure of 20 regional federations with 150 local secretariats, and its eight ‘centrales professionnelles’ (sectoral unions). During the recession of the early 1980s, the CSC called for work-sharing programmes to be adopted, but the employers proved unwilling to follow this lead in any significant way. The unions also faced challenges to the right to strike and exercise union powers, and to social security benefits. In the late 1980s, under the leadership of Willy Peirens, the CSC developed a much closer relationship with the socialist centre, the FGTB. The CSC has no formal organisational ties to any political party, and since 1945 CSC officials have not taken political office, other than at the minor local level. Officially, the Christian Workers’ Movements (MOC/ACV) give political expression to CSC policies; however, the MOC (in Wallonia and Brussels) has since 1972 been a pluralistic movement (with elected candidates belonging to different political parties). On the Flemish side, the ACV looks to the Christian Democratic Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) for the implementation of its policies. A number of politicians have emerged through the CSC route, among them former CVP prime ministers Wilfred Martens, in office most of the period 1979–92, and his successor Jean-Luc Dehaene (1992–99).

   In the late 1990s the main priorities of the CSC/ACV included defending jobs and social security and campaigning for a fairer tax system. In 2002 the union carried out a thorough reorganisation in an attempt to break with the traditional separation of blue-collar workers from white collar and professional/managerial staff. The CSC/ACV now groups these workers together under the responsibility of the relevant sectoral federations, which were also reduced in number from seventeen to eight by more recent reforms. CSC/ACV has an associated International Institute of Workers’ Education.
International Affiliation. ITUC; ETUC; TUAC

CSC / ACV’s major national affiliates are:

ACV-CSC Bouw - Industrie & Energie (ACV-BIE)
(ACV Construction - Industry & Energy)
Address. Koningstraat 45, 1000 Brussels Phone. 132 2 285 0211
E-Mail. acvbie@acv-csc.be Web. www.acvbie.be
Membership. 300,000
International Affiliation. Industrial.

ACV-CSC METEA (CSC Metal Union)
Address. Avenue des Pagodas 1-3, 1020 Brussels
Phone. +32 2 500 28 11 Fax. +32 2 500 28 99
E-Mail. metea@acv-csc.be Web. https://acv-csc-metea.be
Membership. 220,000
International Affiliation. Industrial.

ACV-CSC ALIMENTATION SERVICES (ACV-ASC)
(CSC Food and Services Union)
Address. Rue Haute 42, 1000 Brussels
Phone. +32 2 543 0762
E-Mail. alimentation@acv-csc.be
Membership. 325,000
International Affiliation. EFAT; IUF; UNI Europa

ACV-CSC EDUCATION (CSC Education Union)
Address. Avenue De L’Heliport 21, 1000 Brussels
Phone. +32 2 506 8211
E-Mail. csc-enseignement@acv-csc.be
Membership. 220,000
International Affiliation. ETUC; UNI Europa

ACV-CSC PUBLIC SERVICES (CSC-CCSP)
(CSC Public Services Union)
Address. Avenue De L’Heliport 21, 1000 Brussels
Phone. +32 2 208 2315 / 2391
E-Mail. servicespublics.bruxelles@acv-csc.be, luc.hamelinck@acv-csc.be
Leadership. Luc Hamelinck (president)
Membership. 150,000 International Affiliation. EPSU

ACV-CSC METEALIMENTATION SERVICE (ACV-ALIMENTATION)
Address. Rue des Chartreux 70, 1000 Brussels
Phone. +32 2 244 99 11 Fax. +32 2 244 99 90
E-Mail. alimentation@acv-csc.be
Membership. 264,000
International Affiliation. EFFAT; IUF; UNI Europa

Landelijke Bedienden Centrale-Nationale Verbond Kaderpersonneel (LBC/NVK)
(CSC Salaried Staff and Supervisor’s Trade Union)
Address. Sudermanstraat 5, 2000 Antwerpen
Phone. +32 3 220 87 11
E-Mail. lbc-nvk.antwerpen@acv-csc.be
Web. https://lbc-nvk.acv-online.be
Membership. 325,000
History and character. LBC-NVK emerged from the ‘anti-socialist’ trade unions at the end of the nineteenth century and its predecessor was the General Secretariat of the Christian Professional, which was founded in 1904. It later merged with the National Central Servants and the National Association of Managers operating within the CSC. LBC-NVK is the largest union for employees and executives in Belgium.
International Affiliation. EPSU; EFFAT; Eurocadres; ETF; UNI Europa; and Industrall.

CSC-Transcom
(CSC Communications, Transport and Culture Union)
Address. Galerie Agora, rue Marché aux Herbes 105, BP 38/40, 1000 Brussels
Phone. +32 2 549 0762
E-Mail. u24nv@csc-csc.be
Membership. 37,488 (ITF, 2019 – this only includes transport sectors), overall 90,000 (est., TUW, 2020)
History and character. CSC-Transcom was formed in April 2001. It has eight interest groups: Railroads; Culture; Diamonds; Maritime; Mobility; Postal; Telecom; and Road transport.
International Affiliation. ETF and ITF

3. Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (FGTB) / Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond (ABVV)
(General Federation of Belgian Labour)
Address. Rue Haute 42, 1000 Brussels Phone. +32 2 506 8211
Leadership. Robert Verteneuil (president)
Membership. 1,549,295 (ITUC, 2020)
History and character. The FGTB traces its history back to a Trade Union Committee established by the Belgian Workers’ Party (POB) in 1898. It became the Belgian Trade Union Confederation in 1937, and in 1945 took its present name, uniting a number of trade union federations on the basis of a statement of principle declaring its political independence. Following an Extraordinary Congress of May 1978, the FGTB statutes provided for three inter-regional organisations covering Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia which correspond to the country’s regional authorities. The FGTB’s core strength is in the French-speaking heavy-industry region of Wallonia, where it has comparable support to the CSC, whereas it is much weaker than the CSC in Dutch-speaking Flanders. It has 16 regional organisations and interregional offices for Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia.

The FGTB emphasises that it continues to adhere to socialist principles. In practical terms its current concerns include combating unemployment (its top priority); enhancing social dialogue; tackling social dumping; developing quality employment; lowering working hours; protecting public services and advancing social equality. It is also concerned at the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU, which it sees as leading to a gulf between people and politicians reflected in the rise of right-wing populist parties. It participates in the National Labour Council (CNT) and the Central Economic Council (CCE). The FGTB complains of efforts to undermine social partnership embodied in the CNT and CCE and that the CCE increasingly focuses on competitiveness to the exclusion of other issues. There is a wide range of associated research, training, educational and social organisations attached to the FGTB.

International Affiliation. ITUC; ETUC; TUAC

FGTB’s affiliated unions are:
Belize

Capital: Belmopan  

Political and Economic Background

Colonised by the Spanish and the British from the early 16th Century, the region was declared a Crown Colony (‘British Honduras’) in 1862. In the 17th and 18th Centuries, enslaved Africans were transported to the settlement – mainly from Britain’s Caribbean colonies – to work in mahogany extraction. The Belize Estate and Produce Company, a London-based company that controlled around half of the privately owned land in the colony from 1875, was a major force in the country’s political economy for over a century. Deforestation and falling demand for its exports resulted in economic decline in the latter half of the 19th Century. The economy was also badly affected by the Great Depression, a 1931 hurricane causing widespread devastation, and growing competition from synthetic materials. In the 1940s, a territorial dispute developed between the British and Guatemala; following referenda held in Guatemala (2018) and Belize (2019), the dispute is to be referred to the ICJ. In 1954, constitutional reforms gave Belize limited autonomy and general elections were won by the People’s United Party (PUP), which had been organising a nationalist, anti-colonial movement for several years. The colonial administration tried to taint the PUP as a communist and pro-Guatemalan organisation. Belize became a self-governing colony in 1964, but the country only achieved full independence in 1981. A Commonwealth country with the British monarch as head of state, Belize’s bicameral legislature consists of a Senate (appointed by the Governor General) and an elected House of Representatives. The 31-member House has been dominated by the PUP (who won every election between 1954 and 1984) and the United Democratic Party (UDP). In elections in Nov. 2015, the UDP won 19 seats to the PUP’s 12, and the UDP’s Dean Barrow returned as Prime Minister for a third consecutive term. A new political party with close ties to the union movement – the Belize Progressive Party – was formed before the election but failed to win any seats. The economy of Belize is dominated by tourism and agriculture which derive from loans from Venezuela under the PetroCaribe oil
South Africa

Political and Economic Background
The Cape Colony was annexed by the British in 1806. Throughout the 19th and early 20th Centuries, the British sought to expand their colonial territories in Southern Africa, waging frontier wars mainly against Boer settlements and indigenous peoples (principally Zulu). Diamond and gold discoveries in the region triggered the Mineral Revolution in the 1870s, greatly increasing white European settlement and spurring on industrial development. Cecil Rhodes, who would later conquer the areas of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) through the British South Africa Company, first created a monopoly of the world’s diamond supply by buying up mining operations in the Kimberley area. Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1896, and introduced the Glen Grey Act 1894, legislation which stripped indigenous peoples of their traditional and communal land rights to ‘give them a stimulus in labour’. The British created a disenfranchised working class from these communities, and then used this new workforce to extract the vast mineral wealth.

After nearly a century of sporadic violent conflict, the Union of South Africa was created in 1910, amalgamating the British colonies of Cape and Natal, with the two former Boer republics Orange Free State and Transvaal. As an independent Dominion of the British Crown, a system of racial segregation and white supremacy was imposed. The South African Native National Convention (SANNC) – which would become the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923 – formed in 1912 to protest against discrimination and the exclusion of black Africans from political participation. Black South Africans remained subject to severe repression and denial of basic human rights until 1994. After the Second World War, the country’s economic woes propelled the Afrikaaner-dominated National Party (NP) to power in 1948. The NP (which remained in power until May 1994) created the system of apartheid (separateness), dividing the population into white, coloured (mixed race), Asian (Indian and Pakistani) and Bantus (black Africans). The system served to maintain white supremacy by curbing the rights of the non-white population, including the introduction of pass laws for non-whites and the distribution of 80% of the country’s land to the white minority (in 1960, just over 3 million of the 17.4 million population was classified white). In 1959, ten bantustans (‘homelands’) were created – isolated, unconnected territories where black Africans were granted a veneer of autonomy. All black South Africans were designated citizens of a Bantustan, and by the mid-1980s, more than 3.5 million people had been forcibly relocated into these areas, plagued by poverty.

From the 1940s, the ANC became a leading force in resistance to apartheid, revitalised by its Youth League (ANCYL), founded in 1944 by Nelson Mandela, among others. The ANCYL promoted resistance to segregation and discrimination through strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience. In 1959, some ANCYL members broke away to form the rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). On 21 March 1960, police opened fire on an unarmed demonstration (organised by PAC to protest the pass laws) in the Sharpeville township. In the massacre, 69 were killed and hundreds injured. In 1961, South Africa became a Republic and unilaterally withdrew from the Commonwealth. In Dec. 1966, a United Nations General Assembly Resolution identified apartheid as a ‘crime against humanity’. From the 1960s onwards, many resistance leaders were detained, executed or fled into exile. Mandela was incarcerated in 1963. Military wings within the ANC and PAC were established to engage in acts of sabotage and insurrection. A 1974 decree requiring black schools to use Afrikaans as a language of instruction provoked an uprising by students in Soweto in 1976. On 16-17 June, thousands of students went on strike. Police attempted to disperse them with force and in the violence that ensued killed over 170 protestors, including children. Clashes continued for much of 1976. From the mid-1970s onwards, black trade unionism also revived and became a vital part of the struggle against apartheid. In Nov. 1977, the UN Security Council adopted a mandatory embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa.

South Africa attempted to thwart attempts at Namibian independence from 1966, and through the 1970s and 1980s, the South African Defence Forces were deployed on counter-insurgency operations to derail liberation movements or undermine the post-independence governments of many neighbouring states to which members of the ANC had fled and established bases. These included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The operations were justified as efforts to thwart the spread of communism and prevent a Soviet-backed ANC from taking over the country. Throughout the 1980s, the apartheid regime faced not only mounting international condemnation and sanctions, but also internal armed struggle and widespread social unrest. A state of emergency was imposed for extensive periods. Police and army death squads conducted hundreds of covert, state-sanctioned assassinations of dissidents in South Africa and beyond.

The State President and leader of the NP from 1989, FW de Klerk moved to dismantle legislative apartheid. In 1990, the ban on the ANC and the PAC was lifted, and Mandela, deputy president of the ANC, released from jail after 27 years’ incarceration. In the same year, the ANC agreed to work together in a Revolutionary Tripartite Alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The alliance, which has survived to the present day despite serious internal friction, was built around the goals of the National Democratic Revolution, the establishment of a democratic and non-racial South Africa, economic transformation and a continued process of political and economic democratisation. A white-only referendum in 1992 voted 68% in favour of further reforms. Despite continuing violence and bloodshed the way was cleared for the establishment an interim constitution in 1993 and elections on a single non-racial roll, and international sanctions were lifted.

Six post-apartheid elections have resulted in clear victories for the ANC, with over 55% of the vote. The first non-racial multi-party elections were held in April 1994, and Mandela subsequently became President. The current Constitution was adopted in 1996. In the 1999 legislative elections, Mandela was succeeded as President by the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki (also formerly a member of the ANCYL). In the 2004 general election, the ANC increased its margin of the vote to nearly 70% and won 279 of the 400 seats in the National Assembly. With mounting disagreement within the tripartite alliance, social unrest and disillusionment at the ANC’s approach to addressing apartheid’s legacy, the SACP and COSATU propelled Jacob Zuma to the leadership of the ANC in 2007, in time for the 2009 general election. Formerly Mbeki’s Deputy President, Zuma had been expelled from the cabinet in 2005 over allegations of corruption and a rape trial. Zuma insisted the allegations were politically motivated. Despite a wave of strikes and
protests, particularly around poor local government service delivery. Zuma won a second term as president in 2014 elections. However, the fractures in the tripartite alliance deepened as the ANC became increasingly mired in corruption charges, heightened authoritarianism, and state repression of strikes and demonstrations. The ANC’s declining urban popularity resulted in the party losing control of three metropolitan municipalities in 2016 local elections. The SACP in 2015 reaffirmed its commitment to the tripartite alliance and to Zuma’s leadership, but conceded that the alliance had promoted solutions which were ‘excessively individualised’ around Zuma, creating ‘undue expectations’ of his leadership. Meanwhile, COSATU’s on-going commitment to the ANC-alliance generated a deep rift in the trade union movement, further exacerbated by the federation’s endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa as Zuma’s successor in 2017. A founder and leader of the National Union of Miners in the 1980s and former ANC general secretary, Ramaphosa went into business post-apartheid and became a key beneficiary of the ANC’s black economic empowerment policies. By 2018, Ramaphosa had amassed a net worth of over R6.4 billion ($450 million), making him one of the richest people on the continent. When Zuma was pressured by the ANC to resign in Feb. 2018, the National Assembly elected Ramaphosa the new President of South Africa. In the 2019 general election, the ANC secured over 57% of the vote, Ramaphosa was elected for his first full-term and the ANC took 230 seats in the National Assembly. Former President Zuma faces a corruption trial in 2020, charged with accepting bribes from French arms manufacturer Thales in his capacity as Deputy President in 1999.

The strongest parliamentary opposition to the ANC is the centrist, liberal Democratic Alliance (DA) party which has roots in the anti-apartheid Progressive Party formed in the late 1950s. In 2019, the DA won over 20% of the vote and 84 National Assembly seats. The third strongest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) led by Julius Malema won over 10% of the vote and 44 seats. The President of theANC Youth League from 2008, Malema was suspended from the ANC for five years in 2012 after being accused of sowing divisions within the party, and subsequently formed the EFF. A firebrand populist espousing anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, Malema is a divisive figure with two hate speech convictions. Despite being treated with suspicion and criticism from politicians, media, as well as some in the labour movement, Malema’s significance has been heightened by the industrial violence in the platinum industry. In recent years the EFF has allied itself more closely to a new constellation of unions outside of COSATU in response to the failures of the ANC-alliance.

A member of the Group of Twenty (G20) States, South Africa stands alongside Brazil, Russia, India and China in the BRICS group of ‘newly emerging’ economic powers. In 2015, Nigeria overtook South Africa as the largest economy on the African continent. Since before the Union in 1910, gold-mining initiated a process of industrialisation based on minerals export and the exploitation of the African labour force, and the transformation of the agricultural economy. High demand during the Second World War further fuelled the expansion of mining and industry and attracted many thousands of new African labourers into the wage economy. Between the early 1930s and 1970s, demand for minerals grew the economy ten-fold, with GDP per capita rising steadily. By the end of apartheid, South Africa had retained its essentially orthodox neoliberal character. The positive impact of the ANC’s economic policies has been modest, although GDP growth was steady and at its highest before the 2008 global financial crisis, which saw the economy sink into its first official recession since the advent of democracy. The crisis has exacerbated soaring levels of unemployment (estimated at over 25%), and unemployment among black youth presents a severe and enduring challenge. These labour market inequalities have their roots in apartheid era policies privileging white workers, but have persisted well into the 21st Century. Elected on the promise of bringing jobs and growth, Ramaphosa has focused on investment and the reform of state-owned enterprises – in particular, the electricity utility developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors, as well as the continent’s largest stock exchange. Around one-third of employment is in the informal sector.

Despite political reform, considerable economic stratification on racial lines persists. Inequality rates are among the highest in the world and the government faces pressure to improve the delivery of basic services to low-income areas. The ANC made initial strides in improving basic living standards for large swathes of the population. Access to safe drinking water - guaranteed as a basic right in the constitution - was greatly improved with around 10 million people provided with access in the first ten years post-apartheid. Between 1994 and 2000, the number of South Africans with access to electricity also doubled, with more than 400,000 new households per year given access to electricity, although energy provision has been hampered in recent years by widespread blackouts. Black economic empowerment (BEE) programmes, first launched in 2003, aim to redress the inequalities of apartheid by giving economic privileges to previously disadvantaged groups, although these have been criticised for benefiting principally wealthy black Africans – including the incumbent President. The ANC in 2018 committed to amending the South African constitution to permit land expropriation without compensation, ostensibly to address these underlying historical inequalities, although the move was also a response to the rise of the EFF. A high level of corruption plagued the Zuma presidency and revelations about Zuma’s ties to the Gupta family’s business empire have raised alarming indications of widespread state capture, leading to a still ongoing commission of inquiry; prominent trade unionist Zwelinzima Vavi described the family’s influence as a ‘shadow government’.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic presented the country with major challenges – life expectancy fell from 62 years in 1992 to 53 years in 2010. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, prompted by Brazil’s international stance on provision of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs), the South African government defended itself against legal challenges to its patent laws permitting the import and domestic production of cheaper, generic brand pharmaceuticals. However, the response of the Mbeki administration was also marred by HIV/AIDS denialism and access to ARVs remained poor. By 2005 over 5 million South Africans were HIV-positive - the highest rate of the disease in the world. The government has responded under widespread public pressure and provision has significantly increased since 2010. Access to ARV treatment through the public health sector has made significant progress, with HIV increasingly regarded as a treatable and manageable condition, and since 2010 life expectancy has risen to 62 years.

The ANC government embarked on its Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme in the mid-1990s, promoting privatisation and trade liberalisation in the hope of attracting international investment. These economic policies have provoked deepening divisions within the alliance with the SACP and COSATU. At the ANC’s Dec. 2012 Conference, GEAR was revised and renamed the 2030 National Development Plan (NDP), but retained its essentially essentially orthodoxy neoliberal character. The positive impact of the ANC’s economic policies has been modest, although GDP growth was steady and at its highest before the 2008 global financial crisis, which saw the economy sink into its first official recession since the advent of democracy. The crisis has exacerbated soaring levels of unemployment (estimated at over 25%), and unemployment among black youth presents a severe and enduring challenge. These labour market inequalities have their roots in apartheid era policies privileging white workers, but have persisted well into the 21st Century. Elected on the promise of bringing jobs and growth, Ramaphosa has focused on investment and the reform of state-owned enterprises – in particular, the electricity utility
Eskom and South African Airways. In late 2019, the ANC announced that it will seek equity partners in state-owned enterprises, but insisted that this would not amount to privatisation. COSATU expressed its support for what it calls 'partial privatisation' of some enterprises. Also in 2019, South Africa introduced its first ever national minimum wage. Southern Africa is predicted to be one of the regions which will be worst affected by global climate change.

GDP (current, US$) $351.43bn. (2019, World Bank)
GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) $12,999 (2019, World Bank)

Trade Unionism


Trade unions first developed in South Africa among white workers in the 1880s, and a white Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) was recognised by the government in 1911. After 1914, white labour was represented by the South African Industrial Federation (SAIF). The first trade union organising black workers appeared in 1917, followed two years later by the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), which claimed a membership of 100,000 by 1925. The ICU became a powerful mobilising force and the movement had influence as far as Southern Rhodesia. In 1922, some 20,000 white mine workers went on strike to oppose proposals to increase the proportion of black labourers, including into minor supervisory positions. The strike, which called for the preservation of the colour-bar, was supported by both SAIF and the Communist Party of South Africa. The strike escalated into the armed 'Rand Revolt' which was suppressed by government troops, leading to hundreds of deaths and thousands imprisoned. The ICU – which supported the government during the 1922 strike – had by the end of the decade fragmented and collapsed. Subsequently, the ANC (originally formed in 1912) became the primary vehicle for black African's political and economic aspirations.

During the 1930s, some unions of black workers affiliated to the white-dominated South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC). Other black unions joined the Council of Non-European Trade Unions – established in 1941 – which claimed 119 unions with 158,000 members by 1945. In 1946, over 70,000 workers participated in a strike organised by the African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) to protest food shortages and working conditions. Police suppressed the strike, killing twelve and injuring over 1000. With the coming to power of the National Party in 1948, further trade union activity of black workers was suppressed. Established in 1957, the white-only South African Confederation of Labour (SACOL), was closely allied to the apartheid government and included non-white members until its demise in the 1990s. In 1954, SATLC was disbanded and replaced by the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), which included white, coloured, Asian, and some black members in dependent organisations, but excluded independent black unions from affiliation until 1962. The change in policy led to the withdrawal of some of TUCSA's white affiliates, and the policy was revisited, allowing only registered independent black unions to affiliate after 1969. As such unions were denied registration by the government, they were effectively barred from TUCSA Affiliation. After 1980, while remaining white-run, TUCSA membership was opened to all workers. The organisation however used closed shop agreements with employers designed to discourage the defection of black workers to other independent unions. It opposed economic sanctions against South Africa and had a system of 'parallel unions', under which black workers were recruited into separate subsidiary sections of white unions. These parallel black unions still had 32,000 members in 1984. At its peak in 1983, TUCSA had 500,000 members. It dissolved in 1986, after 25 member unions dissolved.

The initial exclusion of black independent unions from TUCSA led to the establishment in 1955 of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Formed by 14 former SATLC members, SACTU immediately merged with the Council of Non-European Trade Unions. SACTU called for the unification of the progressive trade union movement, opposed 'collaboration' with TUCSA, and developed thereafter as the highly politicised trade union arm of the ANC, claiming 53,000 members by 1961. It was affiliated to OATUU and WFTU. In 1965, SACTU was driven underground by state repression, and went into exile in Zambia, and black trade unionism lost all internal expression until its revival in the 1970s. Following a series of spontaneous strikes by African workers in the early 1970s, particularly in Durban in 1973, concessions were won with minimum pay scales for urban workers and the right to strike, even while basic rights of freedom of association were still restricted. The Soweto uprising of 1976 also contributed to the development of black trade unionism and the subsequent overhaul of the industrial relations system. The Durban strikes and Soweto uprising led to the establishment of the Wiehahn Commission, which recommended to Parliament in 1979 amendments to the Labour Relations Act that would grant black trade unions legal recognition for the first time, and make union registration compulsory. Black trade unionists established the non-racial Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979. The Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), which stressed black leadership, followed in 1980. Several important unions remained outside these federations. Largely regionally based, they, like FOSATU, were non-racial but opposed to registration: among their number were the Cape-based Food and Canning Workers' Union, the Western Province's General Workers' Union, and the South African Allied Workers' Union, organised mainly in East London and Durban.

In the period from 1979, black trade union activists emphasised the goal of building effective and democratic industrial strength, with strike action built around issues specifically concerning trade unions. FOSATU built its membership from 45,000 in 1979 to over 120,000 in 1984 around a programme of 'workerist' – as opposed to nationalistic – strategies, remaining independent of the ANC. The unrest of 1984 onwards began predominantly with community and student groups, but soon several hundred thousand black Transvaal workers were mobilised by FOSATU and CUSA as well as student and community leaders in a two-day stoppage against police action in the townships. A state of emergency was declared in July 1985. The same year, FOSATU played a central role in establishing the new Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and in 1986, CUSA merged with the small Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU) to form the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). From the mid-1970s, SACTU (still in exile) urged unions to affiliate to the United Democratic Front (UDF – the principal grouping of community groups opposing the South African government), arguing that the class struggle must progress within a national struggle against apartheid. SACTU welcomed the 1985 formation of COSATU, calling for a truly democratic centre of organised activity for all workers who are determined to 'liberate our country from its existing oppressive and exploitative social system'. SACTU added that 'as long as the oppressive apartheid regime exists, where the above-ground trade unionists face detention without trial, torture and murder at the hands of the police ... there will always be a need for the SACTU', which would 'continue to maintain its underground structures'. After the collapse of apartheid, SACTU dissolved and advised its members to join COSATU's affiliates. In 1986, the United Workers' Union of South
Africa was established to oppose the campaign for sanctions and disinvestment from South Africa by foreign companies. Launched in opposition to COSATU, UWUSA was revealed in 1991 to have received funds from the security police for most of its existence, amounting to at least 1.5 million Rand. Operation Omega (as it was known) brought together UWUSA and anti-union employers in a covert campaign which led to the murders of COSATU and NACTU activists. After the end of apartheid, UWUSA fell into obscurity.

On 1 May 1986, around 1.5 million black workers ‘stayed away’ from work, to demand an official May Day holiday. Under the renewed state of emergency of June 1986, ‘statements calculated to encourage or promote disinvestment or the application of sanctions or foreign action against the Republic’ or ‘calculated to incite anyone to take part in any unlawful strike’ were defined as subversive. In July 1986, 200 trade union officials were reported as being among the 4500 detained under the state of emergency, while others were in hiding. Among those detained for periods were the COSATU leaders Elijah Barayi and Jay Naidoo, and the CUSA general secretary, Phitoshaw Camay. Repression of the labour movement continued to escalate in the late 1980s. Seven strikers were shot in 1987 during a railway strike. COSATU headquarters in Johannesburg were raided and many officials arrested; the office was later bombed. Another mass one-day stay-away followed to mark the 11th anniversary of the Soweto riots; it was followed by further repression. Ten miners were killed in clashes with the police and vigilantes in 1987. In Oct., Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of the newly formed National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), was brought to trial for treason under emergency regulations and detained (until 1989). In 1988, a further national state of emergency was declared. The National Party government severely restricted and in some cases banned the activities of COSATU and 17 other organisations; raids and detentions of unionists followed. The draconian powers taken by government under that year's Labour Relations Amendment Bill, drafted to curb ‘politically-motivated’ strikes, were described by the ILO as ‘probably the most serious attack on the emerging unions since the early 1970s.’

The proposed Bill threatened to reverse many of the gains for black workers achieved in the 1979 legal reforms. Widespread union protests followed, with numerous work stoppages and demonstrations. Opposition to the Bill united the rival union centres COSATU and NACTU which in June 1988 mobilised over 2 million workers in a three-day protest stay-away. The unions negotiated expanded recognition agreements with employers to by-pass the new legal restrictions: COSATU and NACTU reached an agreement with the South African Employers’ Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA) which by implication specifically excluded several of the law's provisions. Later faced with attempts by some employers to use the new law against organised workers, the unions broke off talks with SACCOLA. In Sept., the Bill was enacted and at the end of 1988 COSATU and NACTU called a summit to discuss further action against the new legislation. In 1989, the unions entered a tripartite Labour Commission in surrogate fashion via an umbrella organisation, the South African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), but continued to organise widespread opposition to the new Act. On 5-6 Sept. 1989, COSATU, NACTU and a number of independent unions organised one of the largest stay-aways in history, involving over 3 million workers, to protest the legislation.

The struggle between the labour movement and the government continued in other areas. The unions accused the authorities of using ‘dirty tricks’ to discredit them, by sowing divisions between the COSATU and NACTU, and between the leadership and rank and file of individual unions. Alfred Maken, a COSATU and UDF official, died in police custody in suspicious circumstances after 26 months’ detention under the emergency regulations. A 1989 anti-apartheid conference called by COSATU for Sept., was hamstrung by the arrest and detention of 28 union leaders together with other anti-apartheid activists. Leaders of the Post and Telecommunications Workers’ Association were detained, the union's offices burgled and another official died in suspicious circumstances, against the background of negotiations to secure the reinstatement of postal workers dismissed during a 1987 strike. Twenty members of the COSATU affiliate, the Paper, Wood, Printing and Allied Workers’ Union (PPWAWU), were detained under the emergency regulations while involved in strikes in the Transvaal. Striking municipal workers in Soweto also entered serious conflict with the police. In the same month, 31,000 metalworkers went on strike for two weeks and won improved benefits from employers. The unions also gave tacit support to the boycott of Oct.'s municipal elections; they were banned under the emergency regulations from campaigning openly.

The most significant sectoral organisation of black workers occurred in mining, where the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) developed to become the largest union of black workers. In contrast, black workers on farms, as domestic servants, and as state employees, were almost entirely unorganised. Mass dismissals occurred after any industrial action, and many employers were active in attempting to frustrate trade union activities, in some cases hiring their own company security forces to break up meetings. The threat of deportation to the homelands or neighbouring states was a potent weapon to curb strikes. Numerous activists were also detained incommunicado without charge under the Internal Security Act, and a number of trade union officials died in police custody.

As restrictions on political organisations and union activity were lifted in 1990, COSATU thrived, pushing its membership towards one million. It joined in a ‘revolutionary alliance’ with the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). This alliance has endured to the present, despite growing tensions in recent years. NACTU’s membership grew at a lower rate, partly because of its emphasis on black exclusivism and partly because of factional fighting between supporters and opponents of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) party. The collapse of official apartheid stimulated a nationwide wave of celebratory strikes, but COSATU and NACTU called for the maintenance of sanctions. They met the Manpower Minister to discuss changes to employment legislation, and complained of intimidation at the hands of the Chief Buthelezi-led Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the rival union UWUSA. After the deaths of several NUM members, COSATU pressed for freedom of association in Natal which, in its view, would destroy the basis of Inkatha. It also alleged police collusion in Inkatha attacks and called for an independent inquiry, which led to revelations concerning collusion of UWUSA with security services. In 1991, following three years’ negotiations between COSATU, NACTU and SACCOLA, a new Labour Relations Amendment Act repealed the 1988 restrictions, restored the pre-1988 definition of an unfair labour practice and abolished Labour Court powers to ban lawful strikes and lock-outs. It also lifted union responsibility for illegal, unofficial strikes and eased the conciliation process.

The 1991 Act cleared the way for union entry into the National Manpower Commission (NMC). COSATU argued for enhancement and broadening of its powers, compelling the Minister to ratify decisions jointly reached by the unions and the employers. Like NACTU, it believed that places should be allocated proportionally to size thus reducing the influence of white right-wing unions. Both pressed for new legislation on collective bargaining rights, extension of the right to strike and recognition of rights for unions at companies. After protracted negotiations
expedited by COSATU with a nationwide protest strike, it was finally agreed to transform the NMC into a tripartite forum for negotiations on all employment matters. In 1992 it incorporated ten members each from employers, unions and government. From 1992 onwards the Ministry, unions and employers worked together to bring South Africa broadly in line with the standards of the ILO. South Africa had joined the ILO in 1919 but left in 1966, due to the ILO’s position of the government’s apartheid policy; membership only resumed in 1994. Freedom of association was promulgated by the 1991 amendment, but public sector collective bargaining was still restricted. Following a complaint from COSATU, an ILO Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association visited in 1992 and encouraged South Africa to bring its laws into conformity with Conventions 87 and 98. A Labour Appeal Court was agreed and promised for 1993, with judges to be appointed by the Chief Justice following NMC consultation. The 1983 Employment Act was then extended to cover both domestic and farm workers, and plans announced to bring them within the 1956 Labour Relations Act and the 1957 Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Apart from the NMC the other key tripartite institution of the new South Africa was the tripartite National Economic Forum (NEF). Labour was represented on it by COSATU, NACTU, and the Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDUSA). COSATU wished to see the NEF given mandatory powers, while business preferred advisory status, but COSATU also advocated that NEF be merged with the NMC. In 1994 it succeeded in persuading the government to establish the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) to supersede both. NEDLAC became the principal vehicle for tripartite social dialogue. With the end of apartheid in sight, many leading union figures moved into the political sphere. Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of the largest COSATU affiliate, the NUM, became secretary of the ANC. After the 1994 elections, prominent COSATU figures occupied positions of power within the new administration. No less than 20 were elected to the new Parliament. Former COSATU general secretary Jay Naidoo became Minister without Portfolio; COSATU’s Alec Erwin became Minister of Finance and Sydney Mufamadi was appointed Minister of Safety and Security. Many others were appointed to civil service positions. But after the election of the ANC government, COSATU demonstrated that it could still act independently. On assuming power, the ANC called for a moratorium on strikes, but COSATU demurred. Its affiliates were in mounting conflict with a number of private firms, notably in the mines where NUMSA was engaging international conglomerates. In 1994, disputes in the metal, paper, mining, oil, and road freight industries led President Mandela to appeal to the COSATU congress for industrial peace. At this time, aggregate union membership was estimated at 3.5 million, an increase of over 500,000 from two years earlier. This figure corresponded to 26% of the economically active population. COSATU affiliates accounted for some 1.3 million members.

The Labour Relations Act 1995 (LRA), implemented in 1996 after being negotiated by employers, unions and government through NEDLAC, established the present framework for industrial relations in South Africa and gave statutory effect to constitutional provisions on freedom of association. The LRA recognised the main trade union rights protected by ILO Conventions 87 and 98. All private sector workers and all in the public sector except those involved with national security may join unions, and the Act enforces rights which enable unions to function in practice, such as access to workplaces, the check-off and paid leave for union officials. The Act guarantees the right to strike except for the security services and essential public services, and strikes may be staged in pursuit of broad ‘socioeconomic protest’. The LRA also set up a Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), which has been involved in the settlement of many disputes, and a Labour Court, to which disputes can be referred after failure of the CCMA to achieve a resolution. However, the emphasis has been primarily on employers and unions achieving agreement directly between them without quasi-judicial intervention. In 1997, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act set a framework, generally in accordance with union wishes, for areas such as working hours, maternity leave and Sunday pay.

NACTU became the first centre to affiliate to the ICFIU in 1994. In April 1997, the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), a non-political multi-racial (but majority white) organisation, was formed by the merger of the Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDSAL) and other smaller unions. On its formation it claimed 515,000 members in 25 affiliated unions, making it the second most important confederation after COSATU, and ahead of NACTU. By 1998, according to official estimates, overall union membership had declined to 2.9 million. In 2003, the Confederation of South African Workers’ Unions (CONSAWU) was created and affiliated to (and, according to COSATU’s president, ‗bankrolled‘ by) the World Confederation of Labour. The ICFIU expressed concerns over the creation in 2003 of what it described as ‘white only‘ unions, referring in particular to ‘Solidarity‘ – reinvented in 2002 out of a one-hundred year old exclusively white miners’ union. These four centres – COSATU, NACTU, FEDUSA and CONSAWU – are presently affiliated to the ITUC. Some COSATU-affiliates have pushed for the federation’s affiliation to WFTU and this has been agreed in principle since 2012. According to ITUC figures, COSATU remains today by far the largest centre, with 1.8 million members; this figure has remained unchanged since 2014 although it is likely to have altered after developments of recent years. The ILO estimated union density at approx. 30% in 2012. As of Feb. 2020, the Department of Labour Registrar reported 218 registered trade unions, as well as 24 registered trade union federations, although most of the federations included are defunct or inactive; others listed include the South African offices of several GUFs, as well as FEDARM, ostensibly a federation representing Armscor, the acquisition agency of South Africa’s Department of Defence. A merger of NACTU, FEDUSA and CONSAWU was mooted in the mid-2000s, talks continued for several years but did not materialise.

Throughout the 2000s, COSATU’s alliance with the ANC and the SAPC, which initially acted as a stabilising factor in post-apartheid South Africa, produced increasing tensions within the labour movement. The ANC’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), first developed in 1996, involved a package of policies designed to encourage growth through private investment and economic liberalisation. Largely founded on neoliberal orthodoxy, these measures included cutting corporate tax, curbing public spending and privatisation of key state industries. The policies produced lack-lustre growth rates, while decimating much of the country’s industrial base. In Feb. 2000, President Mbeki announced that the government would amend the Labour Relations Act 1995 (LRA) and Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997, which business leaders had criticised as discouraging employment and investment. The initial proposals were unacceptable to the unions but lengthy negotiations, which continued into 2001, resulted in a set of amendments to the LRA. COSATU also came into conflict with government policy over its privatisation plans. As COSATU and the SAPC found themselves increasingly isolated and unable to influence the Mbeki government, relations further soured, but both remained committed to the alliance. Socio-economic conditions worsened and wage strikes increased, culminating in the longest public sector strike in South African history in 2007.

As a result of growing dissatisfaction, Zwelinzima Vavi (COSATU general secretary from 1999) and Blade Nzimande (SACP general secretary since 1998) mobilised support to oust Mbeki, propelling
Jacob Zuma to the leadership of the ANC in 2007, and subsequently to the South African Presidency in 2009. While COSATU expressed criticism of Zuma’s leadership, it also avoided direct confrontation and remained loyal to the ANC, even during a massive public sector strike in 2010. Days into the strike, Zuma appeared on national television asserting the government’s right to dismiss strikers employed in ‘essential’ services. Police deployed against the strikers used teargas, rubber bullets and water cannons at pickets. Vavi publicly described the alliance as ‘dysfunctional’ and blamed the ANC’s ‘predatory elites’, but continued to negotiate behind the scenes and soon recommended that strikers accept the government’s new 7.5% wage offer (up just 0.5% from the deal before the strike began).

Events at the Lonmin-owned Marikana mine in 2012 exacerbated tensions within the alliance and brought divisions within COSATU to a head. One of the most egregious attacks on workers by state security forces in recent memory, the incident drew international attention and condemnation. Anti-union violence had not been uncommon during previous strikes and demonstrations: in 2002, two miners were shot dead, and several more injured, by security guards during a strike at Boksburg goldmine near Johannesburg. In more recent years, violence often flared up when police were ordered to end strikes, including the public sector strikes of 2007 and 2010. In 2011 and 2012, the ITUC reported that police had on several occasions fired repeatedly into crowds of strikers and demonstrators. The scale of killing at Marikana was, however, unprecedented. On 16 August 2012, the policing authorities deployed units armed with assault rifles and live ammunition with the stated intention of forcing an immediate end to a mine workers’ strike at the Marikana platinum mine in North West Province, owned by the UK-based company Lonmin. Police shot at least 112 striking miners, killing 34. There were indications that the majority had been shot while attempting to flee or surrender. A further 259 miners were arrested and charged with the murder of the 34 miners shot and killed by police, but after the decision was widely criticised, the charges were dropped and the miners were released.

In the build-up to the strike, the mine had been the site of increasing rivalry between the COSATU-affiliated NUM – recognised by Lonmin as the majority union – and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). A break-away union from the NUM formed at the end of the 1990s, AMCU has won a significant surge in membership at the NUM's expense. AMCU encouraged (but did not lead or initiate) the (unprotected) strike action by Lonmin’s rock drillers over wages at Marikana, which the NUM denounced as characterised by high levels of intimidation and reported attacks on NUM members. During the strike two of the strikers were shot and injured by NUM officials. An environment of heightened tension and violence continued long after the massacre, with numerous reported attacks on and murders of members of both unions. Workers were injured and killed in clashes with police and security services during further industrial action at Marikana and other platinum mine sites. In August 2013, an NUM shop steward was shot dead near the union’s office at the Lonmin site. In the aftermath, AMCU emerged as the leading union in the platinum sector and by June 2013, was recognised as the majority union by Lonmin, Impala Platinum and Anglo American Platinum. The membership of the NUM continued to decline, as tens of thousands of members reportedly crossed over to AMCU, which traditionally organised workers in coalmines and the construction sector.

A government Commission of Inquiry was established with a mandate to investigate ‘matters of public, national and international concern’ arising out of the Marikana incidents, which led to the deaths of approximately 44 people (ten had been murdered in the preceding days). The Farlam Commission was to complete its work within a period of four months, but the deadline was repeatedly extended. Hearings concluded in Nov. 2014 and the Commission's report was finally published in June 2015. The report contained numerous findings against the police and criticised Lonmin for its failure to peacefully resolve the dispute. Further investigations into police conduct were recommended, as was the referral of all the killings and assaults to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Commission further criticised both the NUM and AMCU for failing to maintain control over their members. The NUM was criticised for falsely advising rock drillers that no negotiations were possible. Government accountability was however largely ruled out. Cyril Ramaphosa – at the time of the massacre both a non-executive director at Lonmin and the Deputy President of the ANC – was fully exonerated. The former NUM general secretary and (at the time of the report) Deputy President of South Africa Ramaphosa was revealed to have demanded increased policing of the strike, labelling the strikers as ‘criminals’ one day before the massacre took place. In 2020, seventeen mineworkers are still facing trial for their alleged involvement in events leading up to the massacre (including counts of murder and attempted murder). Eight police officers are being prosecuted for the killings of three striking mineworkers and two police officers three days prior to the massacre, as well as the failure to disclose a mineworker’s death in police custody. But the National Prosecuting Authority has not initiated any prosecution for the 34 strikers murdered on the 16 August 2012.

The Marikana massacre was not only a heinous act of state violence against workers, resulting in a tragic loss of life. The events also generated a political earthquake in the post-apartheid state and threw the trade union movement into a period of deep turmoil. It exposed divisions within COSATU, the tripartite alliance and between the trade union leadership and the rank-and-file membership. COSATU first responded by staunchly defending the actions of the NUM, blaming the company management for undermining collective bargaining, and reaffirming the principle of ‘one union, one industry’. At COSATU’s 11th national congress in 2012, the ANC secretary general (and former secretary general of the NUM) Gwede Mantashe sought to brand the strike at Marikana as a ‘counter-revolutionary attack’ on the NUM. Mantashe warned the congress that a draft COSATU declaration risked ‘shifting all blame onto the state’, and amendments were proposed removing references to police brutality.

NUMSA, in contrast, expressed disgust, declaring that the ‘actions of the police confirm that we have not, post 1994, transformed the Apartheid state and its violent machinery.’ The most radical union within COSATU, NUMSA had long been an outspoken critic of the ANC and after 2012, repeatedly called into question COSATU’s alliance with the ANC and SAPC. This provoked dramatic developments within COSATU and led to the expulsion of both NUMSA and Vavi as COSATU general secretary. NUMSA was expelled from the federation in Nov. 2014, following allegations that it had called for COSATU to leave the tripartite alliance, and that it had been organising outside of agreed demarcation sectors. NUMSA strongly contested the expulsion and Vavi – perceived as an ally of NUMSA – described the decision as ‘a disaster’. While NUMSA sought unsuccessfully to challenge the decision, a number of COSATU-affiliates came out in their support. The so-called ‘Nine Plus’ unions initially called for Vavi and NUMSA to be reinstated, arguing that the factions within COSATU that had led the purge were determined to turn the federation into ‘nothing more than a labour desk of the ruling party.’ In Nov. 2015, the COSATU national conference confirmed the expulsion of both Vavi and of NUMSA. NUMSA and Vavi deemed it impossible to envisage re-uniting the organisations and pressed ahead with plans to establish a new alternative trade union federation, an idea mooted since 2013.
The South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) was finally launched in April 2017 and Vavi was elected its leader. Alongside NUMSA, its founders included one of COSATU’s largest affiliates, the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), alongside new independent unions created as a result of splits from COSATU affiliated unions, such as the National Transport Movement (NTM), Municipal and Allied Trade Union of South Africa (MATUSA) and Democratic and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (DEMAWUSA). While these split unions emerged in the fallout of Marikana, they were also established in response to growing dissatisfaction with COSATU unions, particularly the transport sector union SATAWU and municipal workers’ union SAMWU, which were both plagued by internal conflicts over union investments and resources, financial mismanagement and unfair dismissals. With the new federation’s emergence, the composition of COSATU-affiliated membership significantly altered to one of predominantly public sector workers (2018 estimates suggest 58% of COSATU members are civil servants).

Despite these splits and divisive developments, COSATU-affiliated and non-COSATU affiliated unions continue to cooperate on matters of shared interest. The NUM and NUMSA pledged in 2019 to fight together against the planned privatisation of South Africa’s public electricity utility, Eskom. Similarly, despite AMCU’s resistance to affiliating to SAFTU, the union and the federation launched a joint initiative – the ‘Cry of the Excluded’ – in Feb. 2020 to fight against austerity and unemployment.

Collective bargaining is well established and takes place at sector, enterprise and plant levels. There are 47 bargaining councils covering an estimated 2.5 million workers across both the private and public sectors (including national and local government). It is estimated that over 50% of bargaining council coverage is linked to the public service (including local government). To join the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council unions are required to have a membership threshold of 50,000 members. Eighteen trade unions are deemed sufficiently representative to be represented on the Council (the largest of which is the South African Democratic Union, SADTU). Additionally, collective bargaining occurs in non-statutory structures (including in mining, automobile manufacturing, contract cleaning and private security). Where there is limited bargaining and union organisation, wages are determined through sectoral determinations implemented by the Department of Labour following recommendations made by the Employment Conditions Commission. Notably, the law also extends collective bargaining rights to the police. A 2014 ILO study of non-standard employment in the public sector in South Africa concluded that the increasing outsourcing of some workers undermines collective bargaining rights: despite the South African government’s commitment to freedom of association, and the right of workers to form or join a trade union, it is arguably complicit in supporting non-standard work arrangements which make the exercise of these rights difficult, and which are arguably calculated to frustrate the exercise of trade union rights.

NEDLAC remains the peak institution for social dialogue. COSATU, NACTU and FEDUSA are represented and constitute the labour constituency of the council, which is responsible for the admission of any new labour federations. In the 2000s, CONSAWU was blocked from NEDLAC and took legal action to try to gain admission, but ultimately failed to satisfy the requirement that each federation represent at least 300,000 members. Shortly prior to the establishment of SAFTU in 2017, the three federations represented at NEDLAC adopted a rule that a federation must exist for two years before admission in order to block SAFTU’s participation. Although it has now been established for over two years, SAFTU is still denied admission to NEDLAC. Negotiations at NEDLAC were central to formulating the new national minimum wage, first mooted in 2015 and in force since Jan. 2019. The three federations participating in NEDLAC supported the introduction of a minimum wage but criticised the wage level (R20/hour). COSATU called for its immediate review; SAFTU had long dubbed the proposal as a ‘poverty wage’ and condemned the federations for endorsing it.

The Labour Relations Act 1995 was amended in 2015. Formerly, the law on union representation required unions to have over 50% membership to qualify as the majority union for recognition at enterprise level. The Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014 (effective from Jan. 2015) introduced government powers to award majority rights to a union which is sufficiently representative and where no other majority union already exists. The Act also limits the subject matter of disputes over which employees can lawfully strike. Strikes are not permitted where they concern disputes which can be adjudicated or sectoral wage determinations within the first 12 months of publication. Strikes may be suspended and picketing agreements amended by the Labour Court, and protection against civil liability is suspended where such agreements are breached. The LRA amendments also introduced the requirement that employment benefits of permanent employees must be extended to employees provided by labour brokers. In Jan. 2019, a further amendment to the LRA came into effect, requiring unions to conduct a secret ballot before embarking on a strike. Unions were permitted six months to amend their constitutions accordingly. However the LRA amendment also requires the labour registrar to consult with unions that have not so amended their constitutions within 180 days, in order to determine the most appropriate means of compliance. In Jan. 2020, SAFTU-affiliate DEMAWUSA was de-registered for allegedly striking without a secret ballot; the decision has been suspended on appeal. In June 2020, NUMSA won a labour court appeal to the effect that the union had not been required to hold a secret ballot before a strike in March 2019, since there was no evidence that the registrar had consulted with the national office-bearers about compliance with the new law.

The use of both technical administrative requirements for striking as well as threatened de-registration has raised some concern that industrial relations laws are being selectively applied to target non-COSATU unions and that these are political motivated. In April 2019, the registrar of labour relations announced that AMCU would be de-registered because it is not a ‘genuine trade union’ as envisaged in the (Labour Relations) Act, citing technicalities concerning compliance with AMCU’s own statutes, as well as its failure to hold a congress for several years. The deregistration was avoided, but the move has been widely questioned for singling out AMCU, despite the fact that administrative irregularities have plagued many COSATU affiliates for several years.

Although a climate of violence has persisted in South Africa in the years since Marikana, the ITUC’s annual Global Rights Index has for many years ranked South Africa as exhibiting merely ‘repeated violations of rights’ – on a par with countries such as France and Switzerland. In this period, ICTUR has however recorded frequent instances of violence perpetrated against trade unionists by both state and private security services, and alarming levels of impunity. In May 2015, striking NUM members employed at Good Hope Construction were attacked by guards stationed at one of their work sites; one of the strikers was stabbed to death. In July 2016, a SAMWU member was shot and killed by private security guards outside the union’s head office in central Johannesburg. In Aug. 2016, police fired rubber bullets against NUM members protesting for better wages and conditions outside the Hendrina Power Station in Mpumalanga. In 2017, a spate of murders of AMCU members occurred in North West Province. AMCU’s leadership
expressed concern that the murders suggested a ‘concerted attack’ on the union, a ‘carefully planned, well-funded hit program’. Thirteen suspects were arrested, but only two were ultimately convicted; in June 2019 they were sentenced for the murder of AMCU official, Mvelisi Biyela, and the attempted murders of two other AMCU officials.

In Jan. 2018, the NUM reported that its branch chairman at Lonmin’s Eastern Platinum Mine had been shot dead. In Sept. 2018, police fired rubber bullets and stun grenades at SAWTU members conducting a peaceful protest during a strike over wages at Denel Aeronautics in Kempton Park, Gauteng. In Nov. 2018, at least six workers were shot - one fatally - and another stabbed during strike action at Sibanye-Stillwater’s Beatrix (Free State) and Kloof (Gauteng) goldmines; victims included both NUM and AMCU members and both unions called on the authorities to intervene. In Dec. 2018, Ndlela Radebe, the NUM Regional Chair of Gauteng was stabbed and injured while addressing members during an ongoing strike against retrenchments at Goldfields South Deep goldmine. In Jan. 2019, two SAMWU officials in Limpopo – Roland Mani and Tshililo ‘Ishimangadzo Mositho – were murdered; both had been outspoken in campaigns demanding accountability for unlawful investments made by the Vhembe District Municipality and called for arrests, raising suspicions that their murders were politically motivated. In May 2019, a SAMWU member died of head injuries suffered during a demonstration of striking eThekwini Municipality workers in central Durban; video footage of the protest showed police firing rubber bullets indiscriminately into the crowd of protestors. In Nov. 2019, an NUM member was murdered near his workplace at Marikana, several weeks before a planned NUM rally.

Trade Union Centres
1. Confederation of South African Workers’ Unions (CONSAWU)
   Address. 814 Church Street, Eastwood 0086 / PO Box 877, Pretoria 0001 Phone. +27 12 324 1672 / 12 661 4265 Fax. +27 1266 11793 E-Mail. consawu@mWeb.co.za Web. www.conswau.co.za Membership. 49,730 (ITUC, 2019) Affiliation. ITUC History and character. CONSAWU was established in 2003. Formerly, the federation’s two most significant members were NUPSAW (now affiliated to SAFTU) and Solidarity. The Department of Labour lists CONSAWU’s affiliates in 2020 as including the Building Wood and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (BWAWUSA); Laundry and Allied Workers’ Union of South Africa (LAWUSA); Mine, Engineering and Distributors Workers Union of South Africa (MEDWUSA) and National Union of Hotel Restaurant Catering Commercial Health and Allied Workers (NUHRCCHAW).

Building Wood and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (BWAWUSA)
   Address. No. 101 RKA Centre , 1st Floor, cnr Voortrekker & Rhos Road, Bellville, 7530 / P.O. Box 561, Bellville, 7535 Phone. (021) 948 2664/1 / 082 341 0221 E-Mail. bwawusa@workmail.co.za theo@bwawusa.org.za wponi@bwawusa.org.za Web. www.bwawusa.org.za Membership. 14, 500 (2018 est.) History and character. Registered on 20/09/2000

2. Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
   Address. COSATU House, 110 Jorissen Street, cnr. Simons Street, Braamfontein 2017 / PO Box 1019, Johannesburg 2000 Phone. +27 11 339 4911 Fax. +27 11 339 5080 E-Mail. donald@cosatu.org.za Web. www.cosatu.org.za Leadership. Zingiswa Losi (President), Bheki Nthalintshali (General Secretary)

Membership. 1.8 million (2020, ITUC) Affiliation. ITUC; SATUCC History and character. COSATU was formed in 1985 by 33 mainly black unions with 558,000 members as a federation that would emphasise opposition to apartheid on a non-racial basis. It absorbed the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), which had nine affiliates, and incorporated the 180,000-member National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which had left the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUA). At its founding congress, COSATU made the following demands: (i) the repeal of the pass laws; (ii) the repeal of the state of emergency; (iii) withdrawal of troops and police from the townships; (iv) unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners, and the repeal of all banning orders; (v) the dismantling of the bantustan (homelands) system; and (vi) an end to the migrant labour system. COSATU committed itself to worker control, representation based on paid-up membership, broad-based industrial unionism, and non-racial recruitment, the demand for a national minimum wage, an end to overtime, sexual equality, and support for disinvestment by foreign firms and economic sanctions against South Africa. COSATU suffered serious harassment from 1987 onwards. Officials were detained, and offices were raided and sabotaged. With other anti-apartheid groups repressed under the State of Emergency, COSATU was impelled further into the political arena. It was prominent in the organisation of the 1986 and 1987 May Day strikes and the June 1987 ‘stay away’. In 1987 it adopted the Freedom Charter and reaffirmed its support for international sanctions against South Africa. In response the government proscribed it from engaging in a wide range of specified political activities, as part of a package of still greater restrictions on anti-apartheid organisations introduced early in 1988.

Before 1989, a ‘workerist’ faction – dominant within the predecessor FOSATU – had argued for a concentration on industrial activities but the COSATU leadership, against a background of escalating change in South Africa, retained support for its political focus. Following the dissolution of SACTU, the ANC’s trade union front, in 1990, COSATU replaced it in a tripartite ‘revolutionary alliance’ with the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). A special congress of Sept. 1993 elected 20 officials to stand on the ANC list in the forthcoming national and regional elections. Nelson Mandela told the Congress: ‘The ANC will never betray the cause of democracy, and the cause of the workers. You must support the ANC only if it delivers the goods. If it does not, do it to what you have done to the apartheid regime!’ Congress also adopted a Platform of Workers’ Rights on the basis of which it negotiated to commit the ANC in the elections: the platform included basic organising rights, collective bargaining, workplace empowerment, human resource development, and national industry-based provident funds.

In a 1994 conference, COSATU developed special proposals for the reform of industrial relations structures, which to a considerable degree were reflected in the subsequent creation of NEDLAC. Great symbolism was attached to the attendance of Nelson Mandela, then President, at the fifth (Sept. 1994) congress, but he brought an unappetising message. He appealed to delegates to think of the unemployed rather than of pay demands. Little greater encouragement came from economic ministers Jay Naidoo (former COSATU general secretary) and Alec Erwin (former COSATU education officer). The SACP general secretary Charles Nqakula warned that the new government was in danger of representing only the employers. Despite tensions, the tripartite alliance prevailed during this period. Several SACP members held government posts and Zwelinzima Vavi, COSATU general secretary from 1999 until 2015, was an active SACP member. Former COSATU general secretary Mbhazima Shilowa became premier of the key industrial province of Gauteng, which includes Johannesburg, from 1999 until 2008. Using its position within the alliance, COSATU claimed credit for securing the enactment of
measures such as the 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which covered issues such as working hours (providing for a 45-hour maximum week), maternity leave and child labour and was relevant to many of South Africa’s most vulnerable workers. At the same time, COSATU found itself opposed to some key government initiatives, including plans to sell off a range of public assets. In alliance with the SACP, COSATU attacked the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), which aimed to cut the budget deficit by curbing public spending, claiming it has produced poor growth and increased unemployment. In 2000, COSATU announced a programme of ‘mass action’ in protest at an estimated unemployment rate of 35%. A few days later President Mbeki, in his state-of-the-nation address underlined the need for further restructuring (privatisation) of state assets and warned that labour laws would be amended.

Throughout the 2000s, COSATU kept up political pressure against government policies, but found itself increasingly unable to change their course. As a result, Vavi and the SACP leadership sought to oust Mbeki from the presidency, putting their support behind the sacked Deputy President Zuma. However, having successfully promoted Zuma to the ANC leadership and the office of South African President in 2009, COSATU and the SACP were no more able to shift the neoliberal trend of ANC-policy making. Tensions became acute, but the federation remained committed to the ANC-alliance. The future of the tripartite alliance became increasingly strained following the 2010 public sector strike, the 2012 Marikana massacre, the expulsion of the federation’s largest affiliate – the militant metalworkers’ union NUMSA – and the suspension of Vavi as general secretary, exposing deepening divisions. In the wake of the events at Marikana, COSATU issued a statement declaring that ‘in the face of inequalities our responsibility is to maintain workers’ unity and direct their anger and frustrations to those who keep wages down and working conditions unbearable - the bosses.’ COSATU branded the police conduct ‘excessive,’ but gave full support to the NUM and criticised the strikers for taking up arms.

In contrast, NUMSA – long openly critical of the ANC and the SACP – responded to Marikana with strong condemnation of the state’s deployment of lethal force. With the NUM’s popularity waning, NUMSA had in recent years emerged as the strongest COSATU-affiliate and the largest trade union in the country. The NUM accused NUMSA of poaching its members. In 2014, NUMSA resolved to withdraw its support for the ANC. COSATU’s subsequent decision to expel NUMSA was made at the national congress in Nov. 2014. COSATU cited NUMSA’s proposal to break-up the alliance with the ANC and its failure to adhere to the principle of ‘one union, one industry’ as grounds for its expulsion. NUMSA argued that the ‘one union’ principle – a ‘noble persuasive and aspirational ideal’ – had been often flaunted by COSATU affiliates straying into other industries while adapting to the changing shape of the economy. Vavi’s slow demise as COSATU general secretary escalated in 2013, with a suspension over alleged sexual harassment of a COSATU colleague. The victim dropped the claim, and Vavi’s suspension was overturned by the courts, but a raft of new allegations were raised against Vavi – including financial impropriety and leading a boycott of Central Executive Committee meetings. In March 2015, he was dismissed for gross misconduct. Vavi has insisted that he was ousted due to his steadfast support for the reinstatement of NUMSA, the union that represented the bedrock of his support as general secretary.

At its 2018 Congress, delegates elected the first female COSATU President Zingiswa Losi. Speaking to a Southern African Development Community (SADC) meeting in 2019, Losi (who is also President of the SATU/CC), commented that the centenary of the ILO gave ‘little to celebrate’ in the region, which has the highest rate of vulnerable employment globally. The issue of COSATU’s international affiliation has re-emerged over the last decade and is yet to be resolved. In Feb. 2012, WFTU’s Presidential Council was invited to meet in Johannesburg by four COSATU member unions affiliated to WFTU: NEHAWU, NUMSA, CEPPPWAWU and POPCRU. Reports emerged that these unions were seeking to promote support within COSATU to disaffiliate from the ITUC and affiliate as a federation to WFTU. The then-COSATU general secretary Vavi expressed reservations about the motives for such a move. In Sept. 2012, COSATU’s 11th National Congress was addressed by both the ITUC and WFTU. At the congress, it was announced that the NUM’s formal affiliation to WFTU had also been initiated. Based on COSATU’s membership figures at the time, over 800,000 of its affiliates’ members (of some 2 million) were already affiliated to WFTU. The 11th Congress resolved to ‘retain its affiliation to the ITUC, and in addition agreed that in principle that it will affiliate to the WFTU’ after investigating ‘the modalities of implementing this decision’. COSATU hosted WFTU’s Oct. 2016 congress. At the 13th COSATU National Congress in Sept. 2018, it was resolved that the matter must be ‘handled with care and sensitivity’, that COSATU ‘should have dual affiliation’ and that trade unions affiliated to COSATU should withdraw any affiliations to ‘international bodies’, in order to allow COSATU to affiliate internationally on their behalf. The WFTU General Secretary, George Mavrikos, addressed COSATU’s 2018 Congress to ‘welcome COSATU home’, and in 2019, the NEHAWU General Secretary, Zola Saphetha, was elected General Secretary of WFTU’s Trade Union International of Public Services and Allied (TU-PS&A). However, there has to date been no formal announcement of affiliation to WFTU. Despite the riots that have plagued COSATU and its affiliates since 2012, reported membership figures have little changed. As of Feb. 2020, the Department of Labour Registrar reports eighteen COSATU affiliates. There is no up to date list of union affiliates on the COSATU website at the time of writing. COSATU’s main affiliates include the following:

**Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union (CEPPPWAWU)**

Address: PO Box 3219, Johannesburg 2000 Phone: +27 11 712 0300 E-Mail: chief@cepppwawu.org.za Web: www.cepppwawu.org.za

Leadership: Welile Nolingo (General Secretary), Thamsanqa Mhlongo (President) Membership: 55,000 (Industriall)

Affiliation: WFTU; Industriall; BWI

**History and character.** Registered on 12 Sept. 1999. According to Industriall, after its 2011 Congress CEPPPWAWU went through ‘a dark period of internal fights for the control of the union and its investment company’, leading to allegations of fraud, expulsions of members and the dismissal of former General Secretary, Simon Mofokeng. A new leadership was elected in 2018, pursuant to a roadmap aimed at bringing the union into compliance with the law.

**Communication Workers’ Union (CWU)**

Address: PO Box 10248, Johannesburg 2000 / Transnet Building, No 222 Smith Street, 20th Floor, Braamfontein Phone: +27 11 720 0360/1 E-Mail: nomim@cwu.org.za / mogalanet@gmail.com Web: www.cwu.org.za

Leadership: Aubrey Tshabalala (general secretary)

Membership: Around 40,000 (2016 est.) Affiliation: UNI

**History and character.** Registered on 6 March 1997

**Democratic Nurses Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA)**

Address: PO Box 1280, Pretoria 0001 / 605 Church Street, Pretoria, 0002 Phone: +27 12 343 231 5 / 6 / 7 Fax: +27 12 344 0750 E-Mail: info@denosa.org.za Web: www.denosa.org.za

Leadership: Cassim Lekhoathi (Acting general secretary), Simon Hlungwani (president)

Membership: 84,000 (DENOSA, 2020) Affiliation: PSI

**History and character.** Registered on 24 Feb. 1998
Liberated Metal Workers Union of South Africa (LIMUSA)
Address. PO Box 1904, Durban 4001 / PO Box 27815, Sunnyside, Pretoria 0012
Phone. +27 31 305 5502 / 31 304 2217 Fax. +27 31 301 1600
E-Mail. mawonga.madolo@limusa.org.za Web. www.limusa.org
Leadership. Thabiso Peter Mothloki (President), Siboniso Mdletshe (General Secretary)
History and character. Registered on 28/11/2014. LIMUSA was established following the expulsion of NUMSA from COSATU.

National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU)
Address. PO Box 10812, Johannesburg 2000 / NEHAWU House, 56 Marshall Street, Marshalltown, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 833 2902 / 836 5614 Fax. +27 11 834 0757
E-Mail. thulani@nehawu.org.za / stuart@nehawu.org.za / sthembiso@nehawu.org.za / secretariatPA@nehawu.org.za
Web. www.nehawu.org.za
Leadership. Mzwandile Makeyiba (President), Zola Sapetha (General Secretary) Membership. 240,000 (2009, NEHAWU)
Affiliation. WFTU, TUIPAE
History and character. NEHAWU was founded in 1987 and is the largest public sector union in South Africa. It provides a range of member services including scholarships, medical assistance, provident funds, and group insurance. NEHAWU’s website presents the current membership figure as ‘240 000, as accredited at the 2009 COSATU Congress’.

National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
Address. PO Box 2424, Johannesburg 2000 / 7 Rissik Street, cnr Frederick Street, Johannesburg, 2001 Phone. +27 (0) 11 377 2198/9
E-Mail. tpboko@num.org.za Web. www.num.org.za
Leadership. Joseph Montisetse (President), Kolekile David Sipunzi (General Secretary) Membership. 147,511 (2019, Industrial)
Affiliation. WFTU; Industrial; BWI
History and character. Founded in 1982, the NUM grew with great rapidity among black mineworkers and won recognition for bargaining purposes from the employers’ organisation, the Chamber of Mines, in 1983. It campaigned effectively in the 1980s for the end of the job reservation system whereby the best-paid jobs were reserved for whites. It has members in mining, energy, engineering and construction. In Dec. 1993 it opened the first union-owned training centre in South Africa; in 1996 the Mine Health and Safety Act, which it had backed, became law. NUM-founder Cyril Ramaphosa became ANC secretary general in 1991, Deputy President of the ANC in 2012, Deputy President of South Africa in 2014 and President of South Africa in Feb. 2018. Once the largest COSATU affiliate, with a membership of over 300,000, the NUM has been in steady decline in recent years. Membership was estimated at 260,000 in 2011 and has almost halved in the interim. Strong rivalry developed with AMCU, who supported the Marikana strike in 2012, as well as with NUMSA, whom the NUM accused of poaching its members and breaching COSATU’s ‘one union, one industry’ principle, leading to NUMSA’s expulsion from the federation. The NUM was criticised by the Commission of Inquiry into the events surrounding the Marikana massacre for advising rock drillers that no negotiations were possible and failing to control its members.

Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU)
Address. PO Box 8657, Johannesburg 2000 / POPCRU House, 1 Marie Road, Auckland Park, 2000
Phone. +27 11 242 4600 Fax. +27 86 625 3054
E-Mail. gjs@popcru.org.za Web. www.popcru.org.za
Leadership. Zizamele Cebekhulu (President), Nkosinathi Theledi (general secretary) Membership. 150,000 (2019, POPCRU)
Affiliation. WFTU
History and character. Registered on 11 Nov. 1996

Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (PAWUSA)
Address. PO Box 2759, Cape Town, 8000 / 5 Buiten Street, 3rd Floor, Graphic Centre, Unit 3B, Cape Town, 8001
Phone. +27 21 424 2055 Fax. +27 21 424 6804 / 06
E-Mail. gensec@pawusa.co.za / services@pawusa.org.za
Web. www.pawusa.org.za
Leadership. Berline Rosebery (President), Abdul Hadeed Vent (general secretary)
History and character. Registered on 11 Nov. 1996

SASBO: The Finance Union
Address. Private Bag X84, Bryanston 2021 / SASBO House, Fourmall Office Park West, Roos Road, Fourways, Johannesburg, 2055 Phone. +27 11 467 0192
E-Mail. laurend@sasbo.org.za / joek@sasbo.org.za
Web. www.sasbo.org.za
Membership. 60,000 (2011 est.) Affiliation. UNI
History and character. Registered on 4 April 1925

Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU)
Address. PO Box 1194, Woodstock 7915 / Industria House, 3rd Floor, 350 Victoria Road, Salt River, 7925
Phone. +27 21 447 4570 Fax. +27 21 447 4593
E-Mail. headoffice@sactwu.org.za / hazel@sactwu.org.za / andrek@sactwu.org.za / charlenea@sactwu.org.za
Web. www.sactwu.org.za
Leadership. Thembela Khumalo (president), Andre Kriel (general secretary)
Membership. 60,000 (2019, Industral) Affiliation. Industriall
History and character. Registered on 23 Oct. 1989

South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union (SACCAWU)
Address. PO Box 10730, Johannesburg 2000 / SACCAWU House, 2nd Floor, 11 Leyds Street, Braamfontein 2017
Phone. +27 11 403 8333 / 8327 / 0306
E-Mail. bzkulu@saccawu.org.za / secretariatadmin@saccawu.org.za Web. www.saccawu.org.za
Leadership. Louise Thepe (President), Bones Skulu (General Secretary) Membership. 110,000 (2011 est.) Affiliation. IUF, UNI
History and character. Registered on 28 Nov. 1981

South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU)
Address. PO Box 6401, Johannesburg 2000 / SADTU Village, Portion 74, Corner Dann Road & Loam Street, Glen Marais, Ext 144, Kempton Park, 1619 Phone. +27 (011) 971 2000
E-Mail. sadtu@sadtu.org.za / ntshangase@sadtu.org.za
Web. www.sadtu.org.za
Leadership. Magope Maphila (President), Mugwena John Maluleke (General Secretary) Membership. 250,000 (2020, SADTU)
Affiliation. EATU

South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU)
Address. PO Box 6217, Johannesburg, 2000 / 84 Fredericks Street, Johannesburg 2001 Phone. +27 11 100 2621
E-Mail. info@samwu.org.za Web. www.samwu.org.za
Leadership. Koena Ramotlou (General Secretary) Membership. 160,000 (2019 est.) Affiliation. PSI
History and character. Founded in 1987. In 2015, as a result of a prolonged dispute over financial mismanagement within the union, declining membership and the wider ruptures within COSATU, former officials of SAMWU established two new unions – the SAFTU-affiliated MATUSA and DEMAWUSA (see below). SAMWU was exceptionally excluded from COSATU’s 13th
Congress due to outstanding affiliation fees. The SAMWU Secretariat came to a unity agreement with COSATU in 2019, a new leadership was elected and formerly dismissed officials were invited back in efforts to rehabilitate the union and promote unity.

South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union (SATAWU)
Address. PO Box 9451, Johannesburg 2000 / SATAWU House, 117 De Korte Street, Braamfontein, 2001
Phone. +27 11 403 2077 Fax. +27 11 403 2021
E-Mail. tabudi@satawu.org.za / mosai@satawu.org.za
Web. www.satawu.org.za
Leadership. Nthuthuzelo Mhlubulwana (President), Jack Mazibuko (General Secretary)
Membership. 88,000 (ITF, 2019) Affiliation. ITF
History and character. Registered on 23 Oct. 2000. Following internal disputes over the union’s management, former SATAWU President Ephraim Mpahlalela went on to found the rival National Transport Movement (NTM) union in 2012. A further split occurred in 2015, when former SATAWU officials and members established DETAWU (now affiliated to SAFTU).

3. Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA)
Address. FEDUSA House, 10 Kingfisher Street, Horizon Park, 1725, PO Box 7779, Westgate, 1734
Phone. +27 11 279 1800 Fax. +27 11 279 1820 / 1
E-Mail. fedusa@fedusa.org.za Web. www.fedusa.org.za
Leadership. Masade Godfrey Selematsela (President), Riefdah Ajam (General Secretary)
Membership. 500,000 (2020, ITUC), 700,000 (FEDUSA)
Affiliation. ITUC, SATUCC
History and character. FEDUSA was launched on 1 April 1997. Its leading founder was the Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDSAL). FEDSAL’s membership was 80% white-collar and about 70% white, reflecting South African employment patterns. FEDSAL had cordial relations with the WCL, without being affiliated. In 1998, however, FEDUSA was accepted into affiliation by the ICFTU. FEDUSA has no political alliances. It emphasises moderation and participates fully in the range of tripartite institutions. In 2019, Dennis George, FEDUSA general secretary since 2006, was dismissed for serious misconduct after an investigation into allegations of corruption related to investments. FEDUSA has 20 union affiliates, according to the Department of Labour Registrar (2020), the largest of which is the Public Servants Association (PSA). FEDUSA affiliates include:

Health and Other Service Personnel Trade Union of South Africa (HOSPERSA)
Address. PO Box 17474, Lyttleton, Pretoria, 0140 / Building C, 242 Jean Ave, Die Hoewes, Centurion, 0157 Phone. +27 12 664 6302 / 53
E-Mail. officiegs@hospersa.co.za / noel@hospersa.co.za / kwazulunatal@hospersa.co.za agadmin@hospersa.co.za / admymolandie@hospersa.co.za Web. www.hospersa.co.za
Leadership. Simon Maharangu (President), Noel Desfontaines (Secretary General) Membership. 64,397 (2016)
History and character. Registered on 3/6/1994

Hosiptality Industry & Allied Workers Union (HIAWU)
Address. PO Box 290, Durban, 4000 / 1st Floor, Room 1 & 2, Royal Towers, 30 Dorothy Nyembe street, Durban, 4001
Phone. +27 31 301 0288 / 305 6579 Fax. +27 31 301 0293
E-Mail. hiawu@pcnet.co.za
Leadership. L. Reddy (secretary general)
History and character. Registered on 24/6/1929.

National Union of Leather and Allied Workers (NULAW)
Address. 33 Selbourne Road, Umbilo, Durban, 4075 / PO Box 59088, Umbilo, 4075 / PO Box 839, Durban, 4000
Phone. +27 31 206 0105 / 11 834 5691 / 83 258 4433
Fax. +27 31 206 0109 / 11 834 8020 / 86 689 4920
E-Mail. nulawjhb@telkomsa.net / ashleybenjamin@nulaw.co.za / nulaw.mar@mweb.co.za / roshillarabikissoon@nulaw.co.za
Web. www.nulaw.org.za
Leadership. A. Benjamin (secretary general)
History and character. Registered on 16/3/1926

National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU)
Address. PO Box 7147, Newton Park, Port Elizabeth, 6055
Phone. +27 41 365 1486
E-Mail. office@nteu.org.za Web. www.nteu.org.za
Leadership. G. Abbott (general secretary)

Professional Transport and Allied Workers’ Union of South Africa (PTAWU)
Address. 107 Albertina Sisulu Street, Elephant House, Ground Floor, Office No. 002-010 / PO Box 31415, Braamfontein, 2017
Phone. +27 10 035 0268
E-Mail. headoffice@ptawu.co.za / ptawu1@telkomsa.net / mahlodilebepe@gmail.com Web. www.ptawu.co.za
Leadership. H. Baloyi (secretary general)
History and character. Registered on 23/1/1980

Public Servants Association of South Africa (PSA)
Address. 563 Belvedere Street, Arcadia, Pretoria /
PO Box 40404 Arcadia 0007
Phone. +27 12 303 6500 / 95/ 96 Fax. +27 12 303 6652 / 3
E-Mail. ask@psa.co.za Web. www.psa.co.za
Leadership. Lufuno Mulaudzi (President), Pierre Snyman (Chairperson) Membership. 235,000
History and character. First founded in 1920, PSA represents public servants, public service pensioners and employees of semi-state institutions. The PSA affiliated to FEDUSA in 2017 and is currently the federation’s largest union.

South African Abet Educators Union (SAAEU)
Address. P.O. Box 466, Bloemfontein, 9300 / CCMA Building, Elizabeth Street, 3rd Floor, Bloemfontein, 9301
Phone. +27 51 447 5365 E-Mail. lefalatsa@saaeu.co.za / kplefalatsa@gmail.com Web. www.saaeu.co.za
Leadership. P. Lefalatsa (secretary general)
History and character. Registered on 26/9/2007

South African Communications Union (SACU)
Address. 3B Canal Edge, Fountain Road, Bellville, 7530 / PO Box 38094, Gatesville, 7766 Phone. +27 21 914 2562 / 701 1106 / 82 377 5837 / 86 100 7228 E-Mail. harem@telkom.co.za / sacuo@cybersmart.co.za Web. www.saku.co.za
Leadership. Simon Mahlangu (President), Noel Desfontaines (Secretary General) Membership. 64,397 (2016)
History and character. Registered on 31/10/1994

Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysers Unie (SAOU)
(South African Teachers Union)
Address. PO Box 90120, Serene Street 278, Garsfontein, 0042
Phone. +27 12 436 0900 / 436 0902 / 348 9641 / 86 072 6843
E-Mail. regsdienste@saou.co.za / saou@saou.co.za / pdelport@saou.co.za / jjprinsloo@saou.co.za Web. www.saou.co.za
History and character. Registered on 23/1/1997

South African Parastatal and Tertiary Institutions Union (SAPTU)
Address. PO Box 1952, Wapadrand Office Park, Suite No.6, / Office 61, 90 Kingbolt Crescent, Wapadrand, PTA, 0500
Phone. +27 12 807 4798 / 348 1180 Fax. +27 12 807 4797
E-Mail. info@saptu.co.za Web. www.saptu.co.za
South African Typographical Union (SATU)

Address: PO Box 1993, Pretoria, 0001 / SATU House, 3rd Floor, 166 Visagie Street, Pretoria, 0002
Phone. +27 012 338 2021 / 2071 Fax. +27 012 326 4196
E-Mail. admin@satu.co.za Web. www.satuc.co.za
Leadership. Edward de Klerk (general secretary)

Tertiary Education National Union of South Africa (TENUSA)

Address. P.O. Box 1334, Durban, 4000 / 41-43 M.L. Sultan Rd, Durban, 4001 Phone. +27 31 373 5438
E-Mail. sentoona@lut.ac.za / tenua@lut.ac.za
Leadership. N.R. Sento (Chairperson)
History and character. Registered on 9/3/2005

USA – The Union

Address. 42 Goldman Street, Florida, 1709 / PO Box 565, Florida, 1710 Phone. +27 11 472 3600, ext. 106
Fax. +27 11 674 4057 / 86 504 0968 E-Mail. jplbez@usa.org.za / admin@usa.org.za / pa.coo@usa.org.za Web. www.usa.org.za
Leadership. Chris de Beer (President), Jacques Hugo (CEO)
Membership. 72,000 (2016 est.) Affiliation. Industrial
History and character. Registered on 23/6/1998

United National Public Servants Association of South Africa and Allied Workers Union (UNIPSAWU)

Address. Stand 1609, Section A, near Mangombe Butchery, Giyani Old Post Office BLD, Giyani, 0826 / PO Box 904, Giyani, 0826
Phone. +27 15 812 3455 / 4962 / 73 443 3544 Fax. +27 15 812 3455
Leadership. D. Maselelese (secretary general)
History and character. Registered on 8/4/1998

Transport Union (UNTU)

Address. UTTU House, 182 Louis Botha Avenue, Houghton Estates, Johannesburg, 2198 / PO Box 31100, Bramfontein, 2017
Phone. +27 11 728 0120 / 82 566 5516 Fax. +27 11 728 8257 / 58 E-Mail. headoffice@untu.co.za / annemarie@untu.co.za / steve@untu.co.za / pieter@untu.co.za Web. www.untu.co.za
Leadership. Steve Harris (president)
History and character. Registered on 22/6/2012. UNTU was formed of a merger of the South African Railways and Harbours Union (SARWHAU) and the United Transport and Allied Trade Union (UTATU) in June 2012. The union's name was changed to the United National Transport Union with effect from Nov. 2014.

5. National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU)

Address. PO Box 10928, Johannesburg 2000
Phone. +27 11 833 1040 Fax. +27 11 833 1032
E-Mail. info@nactu.org.za Web. www.nactu.org.za
Leadership. Pat Mphahlele (President), Narius Moloto (General Secretary)
Membership. 400,000 (2020, ITUC) Affiliation. ITUC, SATUCC
History and character. NACTU was formed in 1986, by the merger of the former Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU), both of which were influenced by the Black Consciousness Movement.

NACTU's position was that black workers should always hold the leadership positions in unions even if (as was the case with some CUSA unions) they had some non-black members (AZACTU unions admitted only black workers). While AZACTU was affiliated to the Azanian People's Organisation, CUSA had sympathies with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The new federation was weakened by the disaffiliation from CUSA of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the major element in CUSA, to become a founding member of COSATU. NACTU faced divisions in its attitude to the ANC, which had established a clear leadership position in the struggle against apartheid. In 1994, NACTU became the ICFTU's first post-apartheid South African affiliate.

NACTU has 18 affiliated unions (Department of Labour, 2020). The largest and most influential NACTU affiliate was AMCU, which affiliated to NACTU upon its founding in 2001. AMCU represented around half of NACTU's membership (nearly 200,000). In the wake of the Marikana, union independence of political parties was increasingly emphasised by AMCU's leadership. However, in 2014, the NACTU leadership endorsed the EFF and PAC in parliamentary elections. After the creation of SAFTU in 2017, the new federation began talks with AMCU, leading NACTU to accuse SAFTU of 'poaching' its union affiliates. At NACTU's Aug. 2017 Congress, AMCU was relegated to 'observer status' due to alleged unpaid affiliation fees to the federation, adding to tensions, even reports of violent confrontations. AMCU subsequently left NACTU, but remains listed as an affiliate and the federation's attested membership figure has not been revised.

NACTU general secretary Narius Moloto also came under fire at the 2017 Congress for his concurrent position as general secretary of political party PAC, but did not step down from the NACTU leadership. Moloto has been embroiled in a protracted legal battle over the PAC leadership for several years; in Oct. 2019, the Electoral Commission recognised his rival Mzwanele Nyhontso as PAC's rightful leader, but legal proceedings later threw the issue again into doubt.

NACTU's affiliates include:

Banking, Insurance, Finance and Assurance Workers Union (BIFAWU)

Address. His Majesty Building, 7th Floor, Room 705-706, 22 Joubert street, Johannesburg, 2001 / PO Box 61196, Marshalltown, 2107
Phone. +27 11 836 4564 / 5 / GS-Cell 72 969 0016 / 73 632 3515 E-Mail. mphahlelesek@gam.co.za Web. www.bifawu.co.za
History and character. Registered on 27/10/2009

Building, Construction & Allied Workers Union (BCAWU)

Address. Standard Bank Galleries, 4th Floor, 81 Market Str, Johannesburg, 2001 / PO Box 96, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 333 4898 / 9180/2 / 82 924 5945 / 73 469 9347 Fax. +27 11 333 9944 / 86 240 1756 E-Mail. bcawu@netactive.co.za Web. www.bcawu.co.za
Affiliation. BW1
History and character. Registered on 6/10/1981

Entertainment Catering Commercial and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (ECCAWUSA)

Address. 134 Fox Street, Suite 1 & 3, 4th Floor, Johannesburg, 2001 / PO Box 7480, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 331 2626 / 83 348 6148 / 78 408 4720 Fax. +27 11 331 8642 / 2595 E-Mail. eccawusa@ifrica.com
History and character. Registered on 14/7/1989

Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers (FEDCRAW)

Address. 132 Fox Street, OPH Bld, 6th Floor, Suite 2, Johannesburg, 2001 / PO Box 2974, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 838 3332 / 3 / 492 2720 / 1 / 2 / 11 331 6135 / 3101 / 84 789 8812 Fax. +27 11 836 5982 / 331 3100 / 492 2723 / 86 732 1203 E-Mail. admin@fedcraw.org.za / nkosisomyx@fedcraw.org.za / eseite@fedcraw.org.za
History and character. Registered on 26/2/1993
Hotel, Liquor, Catering Commercial & Allied Workers Union of SA (HOTELICCA)

Address. 2nd Floor, Vusa House, 8 New Street South, Ghandi Square, Johannesburg, 2000 / PO Box 9873, Johannesburg 2000
Phone. +27 11 838 5263 / 3816 / 3433 / 0830
E-Mail. info@hotelicca.org.za

Labour Equity General Workers Union of South Africa (LEWUSA)

Address. Kitchner Building, 57 Amphill Avenue, 1st Floor, Office No.687, Benoni, 1501 / PO Box 1169, Benoni, 1500
Phone. +27 11 845 3797 / 83 478 0184
E-Mail. info@lewusaunion.co.za / lewusa.benoni@gmail.com / albertentshitse@gmail.com Web. www.lewusaunion.com
Leadership. Joshua Mokoena (General Secretary)
History and character. Registered on 02/10/2002

Metal and Electrical Workers Union of South Africa (MEWUSA)

Address. 107 Albertina Sisulu Str, Suite 401 Elephant House, Johannesburg 2000
Phone. +27 11 331 6739 / 40 / 41
History and character. Registered on 14/10/1961

National Public Service Workers Union (NPSWU)

Address. 22 Davenport Avenue, Durban, 4001, South Africa
Phone. +27 31 304 7563 / 083 445 9600 / 083 445 9609
E-Mail. info@npswu.org / patience@npswu.org
Web. www.npswu.org
Leadership. Pat Mphela (President), Patience Maphumulo (Acting National Secretary)
Membership. 12,390 (2020, NPSWU) Affiliation. PSI
History and character. Registered on 7/7/1998

South Africa Private Security Workers’ Union (SAPSWU)

Address. 20 Monument Str, Optometrist Bld, 5th Flr, Office No. 2, Krugersdorp, 1740 / PO Box 840, Krugersdorp, 1740
Phone. +27 11 953 6829 / 79 530 2331 / 83 639 8325 / 79 530 2331
Fax. +27 11 953 6906 / 86 660 3932
E-Mail. sapswu@gmail.com
History and character. Registered on 31/10/2002

South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU)

Address. 108 Fox Street, 6th Floor, Metropolitan Building, Johannesburg, 2001 / PO Box 236, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 838 8658 / 72 029 9235 / 72 479 0361
E-Mail. athalia@sacwu.co.za / legalunit@sacwu.co.za
Affiliation. Industrial
History and character. Registered on 19/11/1980

Transport and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (TAWU)

Address. 14 New Street South, 5th Floor, Bono House, Johannesburg, 2001 / PO Box 4469, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 838 3848 / 9 / 52 / 73 214 9453 / 83 507 5714
E-Mail. headoffice.admin@tawusa.org.za / zack@tawusa.org.za / limpopo.admin@tawusa.org.za
History and character. Registered on 30/4/1981

Transport & Omnibus Workers Union (TOWU)

Address. Suite 601, 6th Floor, Premier Centre, 451 Main Rd, Observatory, 7925 / PO Box 13688, Mowbray, 7705
Phone. +27 21 447 4750 / 1 / 2
E-Mail. tonyfranks.towu@kingsley.co.za
Leadership. Tony Franks (Spokesperson)
History and character. Registered on 1/9/1989

6. South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU)

Address. 34 Ellroy Street, Johannesburg 2001
Phone. +27 (10) 601 6411 / (11) 331 0124 / (11) 331 0176
E-Mail. info@saftu.org.za Web. www.saftu.org.za
Leadership. Mac Chavalala (President), Zwelinzima Vavi (General Secretary)
Membership. ca. 700,000
History and character. In the wake of the expulsion from COSATU of Zwelinzima Vavi (COSATU general secretary from 1999 to 2015) and NUMSA, a Workers’ Summit was arranged in 2016 to prepare for the launch of a ‘new, militant, independent trade union federation’ and was attended by 1500 trade union representatives, representing 52 unions, alongside tens of civil society organisations. The Summit agreed on principles stressing independence from employers and political parties, worker control and internal union democracy, administrative accountability, as well as anti-imperialism, internationalism and socialism. FEDUSA and NACTU were invited to participate in a steering committee towards the new federation, but COSATU was excluded on the basis of its alliance with the ANC. Ultimately FEDUSA and NACTU also withdrew.

Launched in April 2017, SAFTU’s founding congress resolved to build an independent and yet not apolitical, democratic and campaigning federation. It was attended by 1400 delegates from 24 unions with 700,000 members, although not all immediately affiliated. The Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) and NUMSA represented the largest contingent of union membership within the new federation. Other COSATU unions such as SACCAWU and PAWUSA – belonging to the ‘Nine Plus’ grouping that had called for Vavi and NUMSAs readmission to COSATU – ultimately failed to join the new federation and remain COSATU affiliates. Other unions that have joined are splinter unions formed by members and officers who left or were expelled from COSATU unions due to conflicts over union management and accountability. SAFTU has remained at around 700,000 since the federation’s genesis.

Although its founders stemmed from union organising in the formal economy, SAFTU has emphasised organising contract workers, informal economy workers, as well as the unemployed. SAFTU’s National Executive Committee has also expressed a commitment to work with political parties that are ‘genuinely taking workers, informal economy workers, as well as the unemployed. SAFTU’s National Executive Committee has also expressed a commitment to work with political parties that are ‘genuinely taking workers’ demands’. The new federation was strongly welcomed by the EFF, for which Vavi has also expressed praise, and the EFF have frequently come out in numbers to support SAFTU protests. SAFTU further cooperated with NUMSA to create the United Front (see NUMSA, below) and Vavi frequently commented in public on the need for a new workers’ party. In 2017, SAFTU rebuffed an invitation to the SACP Congress and Vavi wrote in an open letter that the SACP’s role in NUMSAs expulsion from COSATU, as well as its failure to speak out against ‘business unionism’ and corruption, had undermined the credibility of the SACP leadership and destroyed trust. SAFTU was supportive of NUMSAs launch of the Socialist Revolutionary Workers’ Party in 2019, but did not expressly endorse the party in the subsequent elections.

Municipal workers have established two unions now affiliated to SAFTU: Democratic Municipal and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (DEMAWUSA) and the Municipal and Allied Trade Union of South Africa (MATUSA). According to reported membership figures, the COSATU-affiliated municipal workers’ union SAMWU and the independent public sector union IMATU have maintained significantly higher membership (estimated at 160,000 and 100,000 respectively); in 2018, the combined membership of MATUSA and DEMAWUSA was reportedly under 6000. In May 2020, the Labour Appeal Court ruled that MATUSA and DEMAWUSA members...
must still pay an agency fee to the majority trade union in addition to any fees to their own union, pursuant to an agency shop agreement negotiated with IMATU and SAMWU at the South African Local Government Bargaining Council.

SAFTU lists twenty-two affiliates, the largest of which affiliates include:

Democratic Municipal and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (DEMAWUSA)
Address. Postnet Suite 1, Private Bag X1, Glenvista, 2058 / 124 Marshall Street, Lunga House, 1st Floor, Johannesburg, 2000
Phone. +27 11 067 0120 / 078 727 7176
E-Mail. Mohao.mokgatla@gmail.com, Selepesello1@gmail.com, sesigati@gmail.com Web. www.demawusa.org
Leadership. Mohau Mokgatla (General Secretary)
Membership. 12,000 (2020 est.)
History and character. Formed in 2015 by former staff and members of SAMWU, DEMAWUSA became in 2020 the first union to fall foul of a controversial 2018 amendment to the Labour Relations Act on strike balloting. The Labour Registrar cancelled DEMAWUSAs registration in Jan. 2020, ostensibly for the union’s failure to prove that a 2019 strike ballot of Metrobus workers in Johannesburg was conducted in secret, despite the facts that the union insisted that the ballot was indeed held in secret and no union member complained to the registrar to the contrary. SAFTU criticised the move as ‘draconian’ and expressed concern that SAFTU affiliates were being specifically targeted by the authorities, despite the fact that numerous irregularities in the administration of other unions had long been overlooked by the registrar. The deregistration was suspended pending an appeal to the Labour Court in March 2020.

Democratised Transport Logistics and Allied Workers Union (DETAWU)
Address. P.O Box 41461, Marshalltown, 2017 / 208-212 Jeppe Street, Marble Towers 5th Floor, Office Number 09-12, Johannesburg
Phone. +27 11 338 9077/8
E-Mail. receptionist@detawu.org.za, vusi@detawu.org.za Web. www.detawu.org.za
Leadership. Reuben Tjaitjai (President), Vusi Ntshangase (General Secretary)
Membership. 10,000 (2018 est.)
History and character. DETAWU held its inaugural Congress in September 2015. The union was formed after a split from SATAWU over financial mismanagement, accountability and transparency.

Food and Allied Workers’ Union (FAWU)
Address. P.O Box 1234, Woodstock 7915 / Vuyisile Mini Centre, Steve Biko Drive, Guguletu, 7750 Phone. +27 21 637 9040
E-Mail. dominique.martin@fawu.org.za / nicoleen.gegese@fawu.org.za Web. www.fawu.org.za
Leadership. Atwell Nazo (President)
Membership. 23,300 (2020, FAWU) Affiliation. ITF
History and character. Established as the Food and Canning Workers’ Union (FCWU) in 1941, the FAWU merged with the South African Agriculture Plantation and Allied Workers’ Union (SAPAAWU) in 2004. Formerly affiliated to COSATU, FAWU is a founding affiliate of SAFTU. The union represents workers in agriculture and fisheries, food and beverage production, retail and hospitality sectors.

Regularly referred to as SAFTU’s largest affiliate, FAWU reported a membership of 127,000 in 2011, when affiliated to COSATU. In 2018, FAWU membership figure was reported at over 128,000. However, at the time of writing, FAWU’s own website records a membership of 23,300, suggesting a significant decline in the union’s fortunes.

In May 2019, the labour relations registrar threatened FAWU with deregistration or being placed under administration for its failure to submit financial statement over several years. In the same month, escalating internal conflict over the union leadership led to the suspension of its general secretary of fifteen years, Katishi Masemola. In Sept. 2019, Masemola was dismissed for misconduct concerning the union’s investment company, Basebenzi Investment Group, which recorded a loss of some R19 million while Masemola was overseeing it. Several other officials were also fired. Masemola has denied misconduct and claims his dismissal was ‘factional’. In June 2020, the union fired its deputy general secretary, Moloko Phakedi, for violating the union constitution.

General Industries Workers’ Union of South Africa (GIWUSA)
Address. P.O. Box 1713, Germiston, 1400 / Melody Centre, 2nd Floor, Office 201 & 202, 159 Meyer Street, Germiston, 1401
Phone. +27 11 873 4804/5/6 E-Mail. giwusa@absamail.co.za
Membership. 21,500 (2018 est.)
History and character. Registered since 1989, GIWUSA was formerly independent before joining SAFTU.

National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)
Address. NUMSA Head Office, 133 Lilian Ngoyi street, Newtown, Johannesburg, 2001 / P.O Box 260483, Excom, 2023
Phone. +27 11 689 1700 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 Fax. +27 11 838 4092
E-Mail. irvinj@numsa.org.za / karlc@numsa.org.za / mavisd@numsa.org.za / normac@numsa.org.za
Web. www.numsa.org.za
Leadership. Andrew Nditshe Chirwa (President), Irvin Jim (Secretary General)
Membership. 328,827 (2018 est.), 192,329 (2019, Industrial)
Affiliation. WFTU; Industrial
History and character. Established in 1987 after a merger of five unions, NUMSA was one of the largest affiliates of COSATU and at times reported a larger membership than the NUM. The union identifies itself as Marxist-Leninist and, until its expulsion from COSATU in 2014, had long been a critic of the ANC and of the tripartite ANC-COSATU-SACP alliance. In 1993, NUMSA announced its intention to withdraw support from the ANC after the coming election and called for the creation of a working class party and for COSATU to lead a conference on socialism – a proposal opposed by the NUM and the SACP. As COSATU and the SACP sought to break with Mbeki and promote Zuma to the leadership of the ANC in 2007, NUMSA continued to call for a non-aligned stance. In the wake of growing unrest with the 2010 public sector strike and widespread industrial action in the mining sector, NUMSA became an increasingly outspoken critic of the alliance. NUMSA was highly critical of the government’s use of force to suppress the AMCU-led Marikana strike in 2012. At a NUMSA Special National Congress held in Dec. 2013, the union resolved to withdraw its support for the ANC and SACP and not to endorse any party in the 2014 elections. In response to the union’s subsequent expulsion from COSATU in Nov. 2014, NUMSA general secretary Irvin Jim described the tripartite alliance as ‘politically bankrupt’. A union merger between NUMSA and AMCU was mooted in late 2014 but did not materialise.

After NUMSAs withdrawal of support from the ANC and SACP in 2013, Julius Malema, leader of the EFF party, courted the union with proposals to discuss the formation of a new political party. NUMSA secretary general Irvin Jim expressed reservations about the EFF’s objectives, noting that the EFF was not expressly socialist, and that the party’s position on nationalisation of industry was not committed to placing industry under workers’ control. Jim also referred to the allegations of undemocratic practices in the EFF. In 2015, shortly before Vavis expulsion from COSATU, NUMSA created the United Front (UF), a grassroots coalition. In 2016, UF candidates contested local elections in the Eastern Cape, although
the EFF gained mostly from declining ANC support. Jim had long indicated that NUMSA intended to push the UF towards the formation of a new socialist party ‘democratically controlled from below by the working class’; in Jan. 2016, he described the ANC leadership as having ‘fallen into the hands of the white monopoly capitalist elite’, committed to ‘enforcing orthodox neoliberal economic policies.’

In 2018, NUMSA announced the creation of a new Socialist Revolutionary Workers’ Party (SRWP). Due to SAFTU’s founding resolution to remain independent of political parties, the SAFTU NEC issued a statement reaffirming the federation’s independence, but highlighting its openness to ‘work with any party genuinely taking up workers’ demands’. Vavi expressed support at the SRWP’s official launch in April 2019 – merely one month before the general election – but the lack of explicit SAFTU endorsement may have dampened the new party’s electoral impact. The SRWP secured only a small fraction of votes and no parliamentary seats.

To the challenges of global climate change, which pose a significant threat to the region, NUMSA has expressed scepticism toward the ‘just transition’ approach promoted by, among others, the ITUC. NUMSA’s President has argued that ‘the language of ‘just transition’ needs a class analysis’ and in 2011, NUMSA established two worker-led research and development groups (on energy efficiency and renewable energy). NUMSA’s position is similar to that of WFTU, whose proposals around climate change frame the issue in terms of class struggle and a critique of capitalism.

National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW)

Address. Success Mataitsane House, 814 Stanza Bopape Street, Eastwood, Pretoria, 0083
Phone. +27 12 342 1674 Fax. +27 86 672 4354 / 12 328 6410
E-Mail. generalsecretary@nupsaw.co.za / smaitaisane@nupsaw.co.za Web. www.nupsaw.co.za
Leadership. Kagiso I. Mokaila (president), Success Mataitsane (secretary general)
Membership. 48,000 (2018 est.) Affiliation. PSI
History and character. Registered on 13/8/1998, NUPSAW was formerly affiliated to CONSAWU before joining SAFTU.

South African Policing Union (SAPU)

Address. 85 Rauch Avenue, Georgeville, Pretoria 0184 / Private Bag X900, Pretoria, 0001
Phone. +27 86 927 278
E-Mail. nationaloffice@sapu.org.za, President@sapu.co.za, gensecretary@sapu.co.za Web. www.sapu.co.za
Leadership. Mpho Kwinika (President), Tumelo Mogodiseng (General Secretary) Membership. 78,526 (2018 est.)
History and character. Registered since 1996, SAPU was formerly independent before joining SAFTU.

Other Trade Union Organisations

Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU)

Address. PFS Building, Neven Street, Witbank, 1035 / PO Box 920, River Crescent. Witbank, 1035
Phone. +27 13 590 1440 / 656 5111 / 5
Fax. +27 13 656 0015 / 86 652 8004
E-Mail. headoffice@amcu.co.za / mabenaem@amcu.co.za
Web. www.amcu.co.za
Leadership. Joseph Mathunjwa (President), Jeff Mphahlele (Secretary General) Membership. 200,000 (2020 est.)
History and character. Registered on 04/07/2001. The union organises workers in the construction, mining, security, cleaners and logistics sectors. AMCU rose to prominence as rivalry developed between the union and the NUM after AMCU organised rock drillers at Lonmin’s Marikana mine to strike in 2012. Since then, AMCU has emerged as a leading union in the platinum sector and been recognised as the majority union by a number of mining multinationals. AMCU was criticised by the Commission of Inquiry into the events surrounding the Marikana massacre, for failing to control its members. However, the Commission also noted that AMCU’s President Joseph Mathunjwa had done his best to calm unrest among the strikers. In subsequent years, AMCU continued to lead industrial action over wages in the platinum sector, with coordinated strikes at Lonmin, Impala and Anglo American Platinum operations in Rustenburg. The militancy of AMCU has been publically supported by Malema and the EFF, who pledged R100,000 to the AMCU strike fund in June 2014.

Tensions between AMCU and the NUM contributed to a climate of animosity and sporadic violence which endured long after the massacre at Marikana 2012. At least five AMCU members were murdered in 2017. In 2018, two men were prosecuted for the murder and attempted murders of three AMCU officials. AMCU issued a statement indicating that it believes the assassinations were ordered by aggrieved former AMCU members. AMCU has also faced repeated threats of de-registration from the labour registrar, most recently in Feb. 2020 over alleged financial irregularities and the fact that several AMCU office holders, including union President Mathunjwa, are no longer employees in the mining industry (as required by the LRA).

Independent Municipal & Allied Trade Union (IMATU)

Address. National Office, 47 Selati Street, Ashlea Gardens, Pretoria 0081 / PO Box 35343, Menlo Park, 0102
Phone. +27 12 460 6276 / 7 / 8 E-Mail. info@imatu.co.za / Johan@imatu.co.za Web. www.imatu.co.za
Leadership. Stanley Khoza (President)
Membership. ca. 100,000 (2018, IMATU)
History and character. IMATU has its roots in the South African Association of Municipal Employees (SAAME) established in 1919. IMATU was registered on 20/3/1997 and is the country’s largest independent union of local government employees.

National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOSA)

Address. NAPTOSA House, 270 Prince’s Park Avenue, Pretoria, 0002
Phone. +27 012 324 1365 / 5214 Fax. +27 012 324 1366 / 5233
E-Mail. info@naptosa.org.za Web. www.naptosa.org.za
Membership. 56,000 (2013 est.)
Leadership. Nkosiphendule Ntantala (President), Basil Manuel (Executive Director) Affiliation. EI
History and character. Registered 1 Nov. 2006. NAPTOSA is the second largest union in the education sector after SADTU.

National Transport Movement (NTM)

Address. Office 301, 3rd Floor, Trust Centre, Kempton Park, 1620
Phone. +27 10 110 83506 / 609 2610
E-Mail. admin@ntmunion.org, craig@ntmunion.org, ephram@ntmunion.org Web. www.ntmunion.org
Leadership. Ephraim Mphahlela (President)
Membership. 52,250 (2018 est.)
History and character. Registered in 2012, the NTM was formed by the former SATAWU President, Ephraim Mphahlela, as a breakaway union from the COSATU affiliate. Around half the SATAWU membership left to join the NTM, which initially affiliated to NACTU in 2013, but left to become a founding member of SAFTU in 2017. Although still listed by both SAFTU and the Department of Labour as SAFTU-affiliated, the union is reported to have left in Oct. 2018. In a press release of Dec. 2018, SAFTU refers to corruption charges against Mphahlele, who ‘was purging the NTM of members who questioned his leadership… and seeking to disaffiliate the union from SAFTU’. 
Solidariteit / Solidarity
Address. Cnr DF Malan & Eendracht street, Kloofsg, Centurion, 0157 / PO Box 11760, Centurion, 0046
Phone. +27 12 644 4300
E-Mail. service@solidarity.co.za Web. www.solidarity.co.za
Leadership. Gideon Du Plessis (secretary general)
Membership. 140,000 (Solidarity est.)

History and character. Solidarity traces its roots back to 1902 and the founding of the Transvaal Miners’ Association. The exclusively white miners’ union became known as the Mynwerkersunie (MWU) in 1913 and became the foremost affiliate in the South African Confederation of Labour (SACOL), which opposed the formation of black trade unions. The MWU continued to ally itself with white far-right groups post-Apartheid, but as the movement splintered the union’s new leader, Flip Buys, began a process of reinvention and in 2002 launched Solidarity. Today the union organises workers in the aviation, chemical, professional services, telecommunication, electrical, metal and engineering, mining, medical and agricultural sectors. Solidarity joined CONSAWU in 2006, but after the federation’s attempt to win a seat at NEDLAC in 2011 has since withdrawn. Solidarity identifies itself in the tradition of Christian trade unionism, is independent of political parties and has historical and present ties to the Afrikaans community. The union is in favour of an economic order of free competition and has positioned itself as a defender of minorities in the new South Africa. In this regard, Solidarity ‘believes that imbalances must be rectified without creating new forms of imbalance. The manner in which affirmative action is currently being implemented is creating serious new forms of discrimination. Because of the ideology of representation the masses do not benefit and whites are being seriously disadvantaged.’ Solidarity also established the Solidarity Movement, a network whose partners include the controversial Afrikaans rights group AfriForum.

South Sudan
Capital: Juba
Population: 11.06m. (2019, World Bank)

Political and Economic Background
In July 2011, South Sudan declared independence from Sudan, following decades of violent conflict with the north (see country profile for Sudan). A referendum on independence was held in Jan. 2011, which returned an overwhelming majority (98%) in favour. Since independence, the country has been led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, a former Vice President of Sudan and a founding member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political arm of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a guerrilla movement at the forefront of the second Sudanese civil war (1985-2003). South Sudan has a bicameral legislature: the SPLM controls the majority of seats in the National Legislative Assembly (298 of 332) and 30 of the 50 members of the Council of States were appointed by the President. There is a decentralised system, with ten state assemblies; nine state governors are SPLM members. A transitional constitution is in place since 2011 and a new constitution was due to be enacted alongside the first democratic elections, which were planned for 2015. The SPLA are still influential in political affairs and the SPLM have been intolerant of political opposition.

Violent conflicts between the government, anti-government forces as well as rebel groups (including the Lord’s Resistance Army) have persisted since independence. Sudan is also alleged to have sponsored outbreaks of violence, including aerial bombardment of civilians. In 2013 a major financial scandal broke prompting a split in the SPLM (led by Kiir’s Vice President, Riek Machar), followed by the eruption of conflict within the Presidential Guard in Dec. 2013, resulting in widespread violence in Juba, which quickly spread to other states. Thousands were killed in the fighting before a peace settlement in 2018. By 2020 neither presidential nor parliamentary elections had been held, and they are currently postponed until 2023.

Around 60% of the country’s GDP comes from oil production, which comprise almost the entirety of its exports. According to the World Bank, South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world. Oil reserves are expected to last until 2035. The vast majority of the workforce (est. 78%) is engaged in agriculture, and 85% is estimated to be engaged in non-wage work. Post-independence, a number of cooperation agreements between Sudan and South Sudan have been signed, covering the promotion of peace, stability and security, trade and investment, coordination on regional forums, as well as workers’ rights. Implementation of these agreements has been repeatedly setback by on-going conflict. In 2012, the government adopted ‘austerity measures,’ cutting expenditures by around 30%, to address a growing financial crisis. At the outbreak of violence in 2013, the government had begun basic service provision and mechanisms and structures of the administration were emerging. The conflict has impacted GDP, with oil production dropping by around 20%, and military expenditure has increased. The decrease in oil prices has exacerbated this crisis. Poverty is increasing with an estimated incidence of 57.2% in 2015, up from 44.7% in 2011; the UN Development Programme has not yet assessed the country for its Human Development Index. China has invested billions into South Sudanese oil production and the China National Petroleum Corporation has a 40% stake in a joint venture developing South Sudan’s oil fields. At the peak of production, South Sudanese oil represented 5% of China’s oil imports. At the end of 2014, China committed to sending seven hundred combat troops to join the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, a first for the Chinese military.

GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) $1495 (2014, World Bank)

Trade Unionism
In April 2012, South Sudan ratified ILO Convention No. 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949), alongside six other fundamental ILO conventions, but has yet to ratify Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948).

Post-World War II, organised labour in Sudan played a significant role in mobilising workers in the anti-colonial struggle, as well as in opposition to military rule after independence. Since the 1990s, the national centre, the Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation (SWTUF), has been under the control of the al Bashir government and autonomous trade unions are prohibited (see country profile for Sudan). This is the environment out of which the South Sudanese labour movement has emerged since independence in 2011. The nascent Southern Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SSWTUF) was established in 2010 and fully supported the independence